Toby Lamb, II v. Brant Kendrick, 52 F.4th 286

Background

On April 6, 2018, inmate Toby Lamb II alleges he was beaten and pepper‑sprayed by multiple WCI officers while handcuffed; his eyes swelled shut and he suffered other injuries.
Lamb was transferred that night to Lebanon Correctional Institution (LeCI) and placed in restrictive housing where he lacked access to the prison JPay system and grievance forms.
On April 9, 2018 Lamb submitted an informal complaint (ICR) alleging a WCI shift supervisor lied about Lamb refusing to provide a use‑of‑force statement; the inspector’s April 17, 2018 JPay response was allegedly not received by Lamb until 2020.
Lamb says he filed a second informal complaint in April 2018 and repeatedly asked LeCI staff for forms to file a formal grievance; he alleges staff refused and Inspector Austin told him an appeal would be futile. Defendants dispute many of these factual assertions.
Lamb filed this §1983 excessive‑force suit on April 4, 2020; defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Lamb failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s R&R and dismissed without prejudice.
The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that genuine disputes of material fact remain about whether prison officials rendered grievance remedies unavailable (thus excusing exhaustion), so summary judgment was improper at this stage.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Lamb’s April 9 ICR satisfied step‑one specificity	April 9 ICR gave date, location and described being kicked and maced; his injuries prevented him from seeing attackers	ICR lacked physical descriptions of unidentified officers and did not explicitly grieve use of force or name defendants	Court: ICR likely insufficient on physical descriptions but, viewed with Lamb’s injury evidence, his inability to see could excuse the lack of descriptions; reasonable affirmative effort at step one exists.
Whether Lamb exhausted step two (filed notification of grievance)	He repeatedly requested forms but staff refused or misled him, and restrictive housing denied JPay access, making step two unavailable	No record of a step‑two grievance; grievance system was generally available and functioning	Court: Disputed material facts exist about availability of forms and staff conduct; summary judgment improper because defendants failed to show no reasonable juror could credit Lamb’s account.
Whether administrative remedies were "available" under Ross v. Blake	Remedies were unavailable because staff thwarted access by denying forms, misrepresenting deadlines, and housing transfers impeded JPay access	Remedies were available in the ordinary course; Lamb did not follow grievance timelines or provide corroborating records	Held: Existence of genuine disputes about obstruction and inability to access JPay precludes disposal on exhaustion now; availability is unresolved and requires discovery.
Proper allocation of burdens on PLRA exhaustion at summary judgment	Courts should require defendants to prove remedies were available and not obstructed; plaintiff need only show affirmative efforts	Defendants stress plaintiff must show affirmative, timely efforts to comply and cannot rely on later, vague assertions	Held: Sixth Circuit applies its precedent requiring the defendant to prove plaintiff’s ability to exhaust was not hindered once plaintiff alleges prevention; here defendants did not satisfy their burden at summary judgment.

Key Cases Cited

Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (availability exception to mandatory PLRA exhaustion)
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (exhaustion requires compliance with prison procedural rules)
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (exhaustion is an affirmative defense; prisoners need not plead exhaustion)
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (PLRA exhaustion applied to prison condition claims, including excessive force)
Reed‑Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322 (purpose of exhaustion: allow prison officials to address grievances)
Napier v. Laurel County, 636 F.3d 218 (prisoner must make affirmative efforts to comply; exhaustion is strict)
Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673 (when plaintiff alleges prevention, analyze whether his efforts were sufficient)
Does 8–10 v. Snyder, 945 F.3d 951 (defendant bears burden to show no genuine dispute that plaintiff failed to exhaust at summary judgment)
Risher v. Lappin, 639 F.3d 236 (de novo review of dismissal for failure to exhaust)
Troche v. Crabtree, 814 F.3d 795 (on summary judgment courts must draw all reasonable inferences for nonmoving party)