Tobin Ex Rel. L. v. Federal Express Corp.
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24564
| 1st Cir. | 2014Background
- FedEx printed an incorrect address label for a package shipped cross-country; the package was delivered to plaintiff Tobin's home and contained vacuum-sealed bags of marijuana.
- Tobin and her eleven-year-old daughter opened the package; Tobin contacted police fearing the intended recipient might come looking for it. Police asked FedEx to flag the shipment and not disclose delivery information.
- The intended recipient (or a person claiming to be) called FedEx asking for the delivery address and later appeared (with others) at Tobin's house; Tobin alleges FedEx disclosed her address to third parties and also admits FedEx mislabeled and misdelivered the package.
- Tobin sued in Massachusetts court for statutory invasion of privacy (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B), intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence; FedEx removed the case to federal court.
- District court granted summary judgment for FedEx—ruling (1) no competent evidence showed FedEx disclosed Tobin’s address to a third party, and (2) Tobin’s remaining common-law claims (based on mislabeling/misdelivery) were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
- First Circuit affirmed: no admissible proof of a FedEx disclosure; and ADA express preemption bars Tobin’s state-law claims to the extent they would regulate FedEx’s package-handling, address-verification, or delivery services.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there is competent evidence that FedEx disclosed Tobin’s address to third parties | FedEx’s customer-service policies and the fact a caller and a visitor located Tobin’s house imply FedEx disclosed or confirmed the address | Depositions and FedEx records uniformly deny any disclosure; policies only show possibilities, not proof | No competent evidence of disclosure; summary judgment affirmed as to disclosure-based claims |
| Whether state common-law claims (negligence, IIED, NIED) arising from mislabeling/misdelivery are preempted by the ADA | Tobin: her claims are garden-variety torts enforcing ordinary duties of care and would not meaningfully affect FedEx services | FedEx: claims would regulate labeling, verification, and delivery—core "services"—and thus are preempted by ADA § 41713(b)(1) | Held preempted: the claims are "related to" FedEx’s services and would have a significant effect on services if enforced |
| Whether plaintiff’s non-party status to the shipping contract saves her claims from ADA preemption | Tobin: she was not the contracting shipper, so her claims shouldn’t be characterized as regulating FedEx’s services | FedEx: preemption analysis does not require the plaintiff be a contracting party; relation to services is the touchstone | Non-party status does not avoid preemption |
| Whether market forces (competition) negate preemption because they already require accurate delivery | Tobin: tort liability would merely enforce market-driven service standards and impose no new obligations | FedEx: state tort enforcement could lock-in service requirements and create patchwork regulation contrary to ADA purposes | Market-driven realities do not defeat preemption; state-law damages liability could have forbidden significant effect on services |
Key Cases Cited
- Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (Supreme Court 2014) (state common-law causes of action are preemption "provisions having the force and effect of law")
- Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (ADA preemption "related to" language construed broadly; forbids state laws with a significant effect on prices, routes, or services)
- Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008) (state laws that substitute state policy for market forces and create patchwork regulation are preempted)
- Bower v. EgyptAir Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2013) (claims about ticketing/check-in/boarding procedures relate to airline "services" and are preempted)
- Hodges v. Delta Airlines, 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (definition of "service" as bargained-for or anticipated provision of labor; appurtenant to contract of carriage)
- DiFiore v. Am. Airlines, 646 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 2011) (distinguishes claims regulating how services are performed—preempted—from claims about airline behavior as employer/proprietor—not preempted)
- Wolens v. American Airlines, 513 U.S. 219 (1995) (treating frequent-flyer program as an airline "service" for preemption analysis)