776 F.3d 615
9th Cir.2014Background
- In November 1999 Tio Sessoms (19) surrendered to Oklahoma police; two California detectives flew to Oklahoma to interrogate him five days later in custody without giving Miranda warnings at the outset.
- Within ~40 seconds of entering the interview room Sessoms asked, “There wouldn’t be any possible way that I could have a — a lawyer present while we do this?” and later said, “... give me a lawyer,” explaining his father had told him to ask.
- Detectives ignored the request, continued questioning, persuaded Sessoms to talk, then gave Miranda warnings; Sessoms waived and made incriminating statements.
- California trial court admitted the statements; Sessoms was convicted and sentenced to life without parole. The California Court of Appeal held his comments were ambiguous under Davis and not an invocation of the right to counsel.
- On federal habeas review the Ninth Circuit (en banc) concluded the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent and granted relief; the Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Salinas; this en banc majority again holds Sessoms unequivocally invoked counsel and reverses the denial of habeas relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sessoms) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sessoms unambiguously invoked his Miranda right to counsel during a custodial, pre‑warning interrogation | Sessoms asserted “There wouldn’t be any possible way... have a lawyer present...” and later “give me a lawyer,” which together plainly request counsel and required interrogation to cease | The statements were equivocal (a question and a report of his father’s advice) and comparable to ambiguous remarks in Davis, so officers were not required to stop | Held for Sessoms: taken together and in context a reasonable officer would have understood an unambiguous request for counsel; interrogation should have ceased |
| Whether Davis’s unambiguous‑invocation rule applies to pre‑Miranda (precustodial or pre‑warning) statements | Sessoms argued Davis applies and state court misapplied it by parsing statements in isolation | State relied on Davis and precedent to view the remarks as ambiguous; Supreme Court’s Salinas complicated but did not preclude applying Davis here | Majority assumed Davis applies to pre‑Miranda statements and analyzed under that standard; found state court’s application unreasonable |
| Whether the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under AEDPA | Sessoms argued the state court erred by treating the two statements separately and ignoring context and coercive setting | State contended its decision was a reasonable application of Davis and related precedents and AEDPA deference foreclosed relief | Held for Sessoms: the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent by isolating statements and failing to view them in context (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)) |
| Remedy on habeas review | Sessoms sought suppression of statements and release or retrial | State opposed habeas relief | Court reversed district court’s denial and remanded with instructions to grant a conditional writ ordering retrial within a reasonable time or release |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings and questioning must cease if suspect requests counsel)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (after a suspect invokes right to counsel, further interrogation must stop until counsel is present)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (request for counsel must be unambiguous; ambiguous references do not require cessation of questioning)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (invocation of Miranda rights must be unambiguous; silence alone is insufficient)
- Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (discusses express invocation requirement in noncustodial context; informed the scope of Davis and related analysis)