Tiner v. Tiner
2012 Ark. App. 483
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2012Background
- Betty Tiner sought enforcement of a property settlement incorporated into a divorce decree requiring Bill Tiner to pay Betty $400,000 in a lump sum for Betty’s one-half interest in Benton Transmission assets.
- The circuit court on remand found Bill in contempt for failing to pay, granting Betty a judgment for the balance and ordering $3,000 monthly installments until paid, plus other non-appealed obligations.
- Betty contested (1) the circuit court’s modification of the lump-sum provision to monthly installments, and (2) the court’s consideration of attorney’s fees under Chrisco factors.
- The appellate court previously held there was no judgment upon which to execute since the property settlement was an independent contract, and remanded for proper enforcement.
- On remand, the circuit court held Bill in contempt in 2011, but Betty challenges the validity of converting the lump-sum to installments and the form of the judgment, while seeking larger attorney’s fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the circuit court could modify the lump-sum provision | Tiner argues the lump sum was a fixed term and binding. | Tiner contends modification was necessary due to financial issues and should be allowed. | No; the court erred in modifying the material terms of the property settlement. |
| Whether the modification was a proper use of contempt powers | Modification served as coercion to compel payment as ordered. | Courts may use contempt to enforce or adjust obligations. | Modification cannot be sustained as contempt; it improperly altered the contractual terms. |
| Whether attorney’s fees were properly awarded under Chrisco in domestic-relations | Stout required explicit Chrisco analysis for fee awards. | Stout should not control; discretion to award fees rests with the trial court. | Overruled Stout to the extent it mandated strict Chrisco findings; affirmed fee award as not abusing discretion. |
| Whether the judgment amount was a sum certain and properly entered | Awarded judgment for unpaid balance and interest. | Judgment entry post-dates remand and was not a sum certain. | Remand for entry of an appropriate sum certain judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gentry v. Gentry, 327 Ark. 266, 938 S.W.2d 231 (1997) (independent property settlement cannot be modified by the court)
- Brewer v. Brewer, 239 Ark. 614, 390 S.W.2d 630 (1965) (property settlements are binding contracts)
- Evans v. Evans, 92 Ark. App. 170, 211 S.W.3d 584 (2005) (contempt power and modification context in domestic-relations)
- Williams v. Ramsey, 101 Ark. App. 61, 270 S.W.3d 345 (2007) (civil vs. criminal contempt; coercive vs. punitive relief)
- Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002) (recognition of Chrisco factors in attorney’s fees)
- Bailey v. Rahe, 355 Ark. 560, 142 S.W.3d 634 (2004) (statutory/fee considerations; authority for attorney’s fees in specific contexts)
- South Beach Beverage Co. v. Harris Brands, Inc., 355 Ark. 347, 138 S.W.3d 102 (2003) (fee-award considerations in statutory contexts)
- Chisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990) (factors guiding attorney’s fee awards (Chrisco factors))
- Davis v. Williamson, 359 Ark. 33, 194 S.W.3d 197 (2004) (extension of Chrisco considerations into domestic-relations)
- Robinson v. Champion, 251 Ark. 817, 475 S.W.2d 677 (1972) (recognition of broad factors in fee determinations)
- Paulson v. Paulson, 8 Ark. App. 306, 652 S.W.2d 46 (1983) (factors for attorney’s fees assessing effort and results)
- Deaton v. Deaton, 11 Ark. App. 165, 668 S.W.2d 49 (1984) (domestic-relations fee considerations)
- Stout v. Stout, 2011 Ark. App. 201, 378 S.W.3d 844 (2011) (requirement of Chrisco analysis in domestic-relations (overruled here))
