12 F.4th 396
4th Cir.2021Background
- Tina Smith, a geospatial-intelligence subcontractor with a documented mobility disability, worked for the DEA under a CSRA prime-contract subcontract and previously received remote-work authorization and onsite parking as accommodations.
- In 2017 DEA moved the program to headquarters and required onsite attendance; Smith requested a parking pass and continuation of remote work; DEA initially denied those requests and demanded additional medical documentation.
- Smith filed an EEO complaint on May 29, 2017; shortly thereafter DEA issued a parking pass but then revoked her security clearance on June 9, 2017; CSRA terminated the subcontract after the clearance revocation, effectively ending Smith’s work for DEA.
- At summary judgment the district court held Smith was an independent contractor (so ADA did not apply to CSRA), found CSRA was not a joint employer, ruled DEA provided a reasonable accommodation (parking pass) and rejected Smith’s retaliation claim.
- On appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court as to the disability-accommodation/discrimination claims but vacated summary judgment on retaliation and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Smith was an employee of CSRA for ADA coverage | Smith argued the economic realities and control showed an employment relationship or that CSRA was a joint employer with DEA | CSRA argued the written consultant agreement and lack of control show she was an independent contractor | Court: Smith was an independent contractor; ADA does not apply to CSRA (affirmed) |
| Whether CSRA was a joint employer with DEA | Smith argued CSRA shared control with DEA and thus is liable under ADA | CSRA argued DEA exercised primary control (tasking, supervision, place of work), so CSRA was not a joint employer | Court: CSRA not a joint employer (affirmed) |
| Whether DEA refused to provide reasonable accommodation (Rehab Act) | Smith argued DEA’s refusal to continue remote work and initial denial of parking amounted to denial of reasonable accommodation | DEA argued it offered the medically supported accommodation (parking pass), delay was reasonable while request was considered, and remote work was not required by medical docs | Court: DEA provided a reasonable accommodation (parking pass) and denial of remote work was not a legal refusal (affirmed) |
| Whether DEA retaliated by revoking clearance and causing contract termination | Smith argued temporal proximity, communications, and the sequence of events (EEO complaint then adverse action) support causation and pretext | DEA argued nondiscriminatory reasons (performance issues, security concerns) and disputed decisionmaker knowledge of the EEO complaint | Court: Prima facie causation and pretext issues survive summary judgment; summary judgment on retaliation vacated and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1983) (economic-realities/eleven-factor test for independent-contractor status)
- Butler v. Drive Automotive Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2015) (nine-factor joint-employer test; control is principal guidepost)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation claims)
- Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562 (4th Cir. 2015) (ADA elements and summary-judgment standards)
- Hannah P. v. Coats, 916 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2019) (delay in accommodation can be reasonable when request is under active consideration)
- Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., 789 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2015) (employer may provide an alternative reasonable accommodation)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (prima facie case plus evidence the employer's stated reason is false can permit inference of discrimination)
- Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2001) (elements of a prima facie retaliation claim)
- Cilecek v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 115 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 1997) (employee v. independent-contractor status is a question of law)
- Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653 (4th Cir. 1998) (employer’s knowledge of the protected activity is necessary for retaliation causation)