Tina Ray v. Michael Roane, 948 F.3d 222

On Sept. 24, 2017, Officer Michael Roane went to Tina Ray’s home to assist serving an arrest warrant; Ray’s 150‑lb German Shepherd, Jax, was tethered in a yard “play area.”
Roane parked inside the dog’s play area; other officers gestured for him to wait while Ray attempted to secure Jax.
Jax barked and approached Roane but reached the end of a zip‑lead and could not get closer; Ray was holding the fully‑extended lead and calling the dog.
After stopping his retreat and stepping forward over the dog, Roane shot Jax in the head, killing it.
Ray sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an unreasonable seizure (Fourth Amendment) and state tort claims; the district court dismissed the § 1983 claim and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, finding the shooting reasonable and Roane entitled to qualified immunity.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding the complaint plausibly alleged an unconstitutional seizure and that qualified immunity was inappropriate to decide at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether shooting Jax was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment	Ray: Jax was tethered, could not reach Roane, and posed no imminent threat, so killing the dog was an unreasonable seizure of property/personal effect	Roane: Jax was large, alarmed, barking, and advanced within a step; an officer could reasonably perceive an imminent threat	Court: Accepting complaint facts, plausible that Jax posed no imminent threat; complaint states a Fourth Amendment claim
Whether the complaint’s factual allegations suffice at motion to dismiss	Ray: Allegations must be accepted as true and reasonable inferences drawn for plaintiff; facts show dog could not reach officer	Roane: Conflicting record evidence and case law (summary‑judgment decisions) support that shooting was reasonable	Court: On 12(b)(6) review, must credit complaint allegations and inferences for Ray; district court improperly weighed conflicting evidence
Whether Roane is entitled to qualified immunity	Ray: General Fourth Amendment principles and circuit consensus clearly established that deadly force against a pet is unreasonable absent an immediate danger	Roane: No directly on‑point authority for these exact facts; officers are entitled to deference for split‑second judgments	Court: Right was clearly established under Altman and persuasive consensus from other circuits; qualified immunity not appropriate at this stage

Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2003) (dogs are Fourth Amendment "effects" and seizure reasonableness balances owner interest and safety)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (use‑of‑force analysis requires allowance for split‑second judgments)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two‑prong framework)
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (officials protected unless conduct violates clearly established law)
Robinson v. Pezzat, 818 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (noting circuit consensus that deadly force against a household pet is reasonable only if it poses an immediate danger)
Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dep’t, 844 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2016) (dog‑shooting reasonable only when dog poses an imminent threat)
Carroll v. Cty. of Monroe, 712 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2013) (reasonableness contingent on genuine threat to officer safety)
Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2008) (use of deadly force against household pet reasonable only for immediate danger)
San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2005) (Fourth Amendment forbids unnecessary destruction of property, including pets)
Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001) (state may not destroy a pet when it poses no immediate danger)