Tina Ray v. City of Tallahassee
664 F. App'x 816
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- Tina Ray, a probationary City of Tallahassee permit technician, was hired Jan 13, 2014 and struggled with job performance in Building Inspections (BI).
- On April 16 supervisors told Ray she would be fired; she refused to resign and on April 20 received notice her probation would end April 30.
- On April 20 Ray filed a grievance alleging racial harassment by a Black coworker, Carol Horsey; management investigated and transferred Ray to Land Use and Environmental Services (LUES) with extended probation.
- Ray continued to have performance issues in LUES; on June 2 her LUES supervisor and administrator terminated her employment for poor performance.
- Ray sued for retaliatory discharge under Title VII, the Florida Civil Rights Act, and the Florida Whistleblower Act, claiming termination was retaliation for complaining about racial discrimination; the district court granted summary judgment for the City and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ray established a retaliatory-discharge claim (retaliation for complaining about racial discrimination) | Ray contends her complaint about Horsey was protected activity and the City's proffered performance-based reasons were pretextual (pointing to policy deviations, documentation, short transfer, and temporal proximity) | City argues Ray was legitimately terminated for poor performance in LUES and decisionmakers in LUES were unaware of Ray's BI complaint, so no causal link or pretext | Affirmed: Ray failed to prove causation or pretext; LUES decisionmakers did not know of the complaint and employer's reason was a non-discriminatory basis for termination |
Key Cases Cited
- Hinson v. Clinch Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 2000) (direct or circumstantial evidence governs Title VII claims)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination/retaliation claims)
- Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2000) (PWA claims follow Title VII burden-shifting)
- Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998) (FCRA claims follow Title VII framework)
- Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009) (plaintiff must show employer's reason is pretext after defendant articulates legitimate reason)
- Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457 (11th Cir. 1998) (elements of prima facie retaliation case)
- Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff bears ultimate burden to show pretext)
- Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2002) (pretext is a coverup for discriminatory decision)
- Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff must meet employer's proffered reason head-on)
- St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (pretext requires showing the employer's reason was false and discrimination was real reason)
- Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010) (focus on employer's perception in pretext inquiry)
- Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff cannot simply dispute the wisdom of employer's reason)
- Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1996) (conclusory allegations insufficient to show discrimination)
- Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (summary judgment standard and drawing inferences for non-moving party)