Tina Marie Hodge v. Chadwick Craig
2012 Tenn. LEXIS 720
| Tenn. | 2012Background
- Chadwick Craig, former husband of Tina Hodge, learned Kyle was not his biological son after a 2007 DNA test.
- Craig sued Hodge in Maury County Chancery Court claiming intentional misrepresentation regarding Kyle’s paternity.
- Trial court found Hodge knowingly misrepresented Kyle’s paternity and awarded damages including child support payments and emotional distress.
- Court of Appeals affirmed misrepresentation finding but vacated certain damages, including retroactive child-support-like damages and emotional-distress/attorney’s fees, and remanded.
- This Court held that a former spouse may pursue common-law intentional misrepresentation for paternity misrepresentation, and that post-divorce payments may compensate pecuniary losses without retroactively modifying child support.
- Damages for post-divorce payments were limited to pecuniary losses caused by justifiable reliance, with remand to adjust the damages amount.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether paternity misrepresentation supports a common-law claim | Craig seeks common-law fraud for misrepresentation of paternity. | Hodge argues against creating a new paternity fraud action and public policy concerns. | Public policy does not bar a common-law intentional misrepresentation claim. |
| Whether negligent misrepresentation is actionable here | Craig could recover under negligent misrepresentation as a sister tort to fraud. | Negligent misrepresentation is limited to business/commercial contexts and not private paternity matters. | No expansion of negligent misrepresentation to private paternity context. |
| Whether damages based on post-divorce child-support-like payments constitute retroactive modification | Damages reflect misrepresentation-related pecuniary losses, not retroactive child support. | Such damages modify past child-support obligations. | Not a retroactive modification; remand to adjust damages amount. |
| Whether emotional-distress and attorney’s-fee damages are recoverable | Requests for emotional-distress and fees related to misrepresentation may be valid. | Courts should limit damages for misrepresentation to pecuniary loss; avoid emotional distress and fees where not proper. | Issues regarding emotional distress and attorney’s fees not resolved on record; remanded guidance noted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rutledge v. Barrett, 802 S.W.2d 606 (Tenn. 1991) (public-policy/history for retroactive effects of child-support statutes)
- Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S.W. 1042 (Tenn. 1904) (public policy and evolving common law authority)
- Taylor v. Beard, 104 S.W.3d 507 (Tenn. 2003) (limits on judicially declaring public policy; need for legislative action)
- Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987) (court may modify common-law rules reflecting changed conditions)
- First Nat'l Bank of Louisville v. Brooks Farms, 821 S.W.2d 925 (Tenn. 1991) (terminology of intentional misrepresentation; deceit lineage)
- John Martin Co. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1991) (negligent misrepresentation framework in Tennessee)
- Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. 1997) (negligent misrepresentation limited to business/guide-in-transaction context)