Tina Grant v. City of Blytheville, Arkansas, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20391

Background

Johnny Lee Grant, a 59-year-old Black at-will employee, was fired by Blytheville Public Works Director Marvin Crawford on Sept. 26, 2012 after a dispute about reassignment of truck-driving duties. Grant claimed he was dismissed for race and age discrimination (Title VII, ADEA, § 1983).
Grant alleged he was told he would no longer drive; Crawford and other witnesses testified Grant refused to work unless he could continue driving, and Crawford fired him for insubordination. Grant denied refusing to work.
Grant filed an EEOC charge, then a separate federal suit; the City missed the initial answer deadline due to internal confusion, the clerk entered default, and the district court later set aside the default for good cause and allowed the City to answer.
On summary judgment the district court found Grant had shown a prima facie case but failed to show pretext to rebut the City’s nondiscriminatory reason (insubordination); the court granted summary judgment for the City and denied reconsideration.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, but on the alternative ground that Grant failed to establish the fourth element of a prima facie case—circumstances giving rise to an inference of race or age discrimination—because he produced no evidence of a similarly situated employee treated better, biased remarks, policy departures, or meaningful shifts in the employer’s explanation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether court erred in setting aside clerk’s entry of default	Grant: City’s late answer warranted default judgment on merits	City: late answer excusable due to internal confusion; promptly moved to set aside	Affirmed: district court did not err setting aside default (good cause; no bad faith; meritorious defense; no prejudice)
Whether Grant established prima facie discrimination (inference element)	Grant: circumstances (personnel demographics, alleged disparate treatment, perceived unfairness) raise inference of race/age discrimination	City: no comparator similarly situated and treated better; decisionmaker treated blacks and whites similarly; no biased comments or policy violations shown	Held: Grant failed to show sufficient evidence to infer discrimination; prima facie case not established
Whether City’s proffered reason (insubordination) was pretextual	Grant: employer’s explanations and personnel statements show inconsistency/statistical pattern implying pretext	City: consistent reason—insubordination; testimonial and documentary record supports it	Held: No evidence of substantial shifting explanations or other indicia of pretext; summary judgment for City affirmed
Whether denial of motion to amend to add due-process claim re: state unemployment benefits was error	Grant: sought to add claim to recover withheld benefits	City/State: ADWS is a state agency entitled to sovereign immunity	Held: Denial proper as amendment would be futile due to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity

Key Cases Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (established burden-shifting framework for circumstantial employment-discrimination claims)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (plaintiff must prove employer’s stated reason is pretext to survive judgment)
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (summary-judgment standards and prima facie proof discussion)
Noreen v. PharMerica Corp., 833 F.3d 988 (statistical allegations require probative showing to infer discrimination)
Young v. Builders Steel Co., 754 F.3d 573 (pretext can satisfy inference element; standards for similarly situated comparators)
Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011 (biased comments and comparators as means to show inference of discrimination)
Twiggs v. Selig, 679 F.3d 990 (discrepancies in employer’s explanations must be substantial to show pretext)
Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948 (statistical evidence probative only if it analyzes comparable employees)