Timothy Williams v. David Scott
682 F. App'x 865
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Timothy Williams was arrested June 9, 2011 after Deputy P.D. Chesney obtained a magistrate-issued warrant charging him with identity fraud, making terroristic threats, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
- Chesney sought the warrant after consulting his supervisor and the Cobb County District Attorney’s Office; Chesney swore the warrant the same day as the arrest.
- At a July 29, 2011 preliminary hearing Williams (with counsel) conceded probable cause; the state agreed to admit him to bail under bond.
- Assistant District Attorney Kimberly Schwartz later concluded the evidence was insufficient and recommended dismissal; the warrant was dismissed December 31, 2012.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution against Chesney (among others); the district court granted Chesney summary judgment based on qualified immunity (arguable probable cause); this appeal concerns the summary judgment order as to Chesney.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chesney instituted or continued a criminal prosecution that supports a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim | Chesney initiated prosecution by obtaining the arrest warrant and swearing it out | Chesney acted in official capacity by applying for a warrant; prosecution followed | Chesney sought and caused the prosecution by obtaining the warrant (element satisfied) |
| Whether Chesney acted with malice or without probable cause | Williams argues Chesney lacked probable cause and acted maliciously in obtaining the warrant | Chesney argues he had probable cause (or arguable probable cause) and acted in good faith after consulting supervisors and the DA’s office | Court held there was no genuine dispute of material fact on malice; Chesney lacked malice because he consulted supervisors and the DA and had no reason to know charges lacked probable cause |
| Effect of prosecutor’s involvement on officer liability | Williams contends prosecutor’s later dismissal does not negate officer’s malice or lack of probable cause | Chesney relies on the DA’s involvement and the prosecutor’s initial view to show lack of malice | Court emphasized prosecutor involvement as strong evidence negating malice and affirmed summary judgment for Chesney |
| Whether summary judgment for Chesney was appropriate (qualified immunity not reached) | Williams opposes summary judgment, arguing disputed facts about intent and probable cause | Chesney sought judgment; court evaluated malice and probable cause views under summary judgment standard | Court affirmed district court’s summary judgment on ground Chesney lacked malice; it did not decide qualified immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 2006) (summary judgment review de novo; evidence viewed for nonmoving party)
- Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000 (11th Cir. 1998) (malicious prosecution is a § 1983 Fourth Amendment tort)
- Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872 (11th Cir. 2003) (elements of malicious prosecution under federal and Georgia law)
- Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2016) (officer liable if application should have known it lacked probable cause or contained material falsehoods)
- Marshall v. Browning, 712 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (seeking an arrest warrant in consultation with a district attorney negates actual malice)