855 F.3d 730
7th Cir.2017Background
- Ozinga Brothers, a closely held, for-profit concrete company, sued in 2013 to block the ACA contraception mandate under RFRA and related claims because owners objected to certain contraceptives as abortifacients.
- The government had an accommodation (alternative compliance mechanism) for certain religious, not-for-profit employers but originally excluded for-profit employers like Ozinga.
- Ozinga obtained a preliminary injunction based on earlier Seventh Circuit rulings that closely held firms likely prevailed under RFRA; the district court later entered a permanent injunction limited to the pre-Hobby Lobby regulatory regime.
- The Supreme Court decided Hobby Lobby, holding closely held for-profit firms could object under RFRA and suggesting the government could extend the accommodation to such firms.
- In July 2015 the government revised the accommodation to include closely held for-profit employers; Ozinga became eligible to use it but did not amend its complaint to challenge the accommodation’s particulars.
- The Seventh Circuit held that once the accommodation was revised to cover Ozinga, the company’s challenge to exclusion from the old regulation was moot, so the permanent injunction against the superseded rule should not have been entered; the case is vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ozinga’s challenge to the contraception mandate remained justiciable after the government revised the accommodation to include for-profit employers | Ozinga sought a broad permanent injunction barring enforcement of the mandate against it, arguing the injunction should cover post-Hobby Lobby regulations too | Government argued the requested injunctive relief should be limited to the pre-Hobby Lobby regulation Ozinga actually challenged; once accommodation extended, there was no live controversy | The court held the case became moot when the accommodation was revised to include closely held for-profits; injunction against the superseded rule was improper and case must be dismissed as moot |
| Whether the district court abused discretion by adopting the government’s narrower injunction rather than Ozinga’s broader injunction | Ozinga argued the narrower injunction provided no lasting relief because it targeted a superseded regulatory regime | Government argued narrowing was appropriate because Ozinga’s complaint targeted the exclusion from the original accommodation, not the accommodation’s substantive adequacy | Seventh Circuit found no abuse in choosing the narrower injunction as proposed, but held the real error was issuing any injunction after the accommodation changed because mootness had arisen |
| Whether Ozinga adequately alleged that the revised accommodation itself is inadequate | Ozinga suggested the Zubik line of cases left open the possibility the accommodation might be insufficient | Government noted Ozinga never amended its complaint or pleaded facts showing the accommodation failed to protect its religious exercise | Court held Ozinga made no showing the revised accommodation continued to injure it; it never challenged the accommodation’s terms and could bring a new suit if necessary |
| Whether Ozinga remains a prevailing party entitled to fees despite mootness | Ozinga had obtained preliminary injunctive relief earlier in the litigation | Government did not contest fee entitlement based on earlier relief | Court stated Ozinga remains a prevailing party and the district court may award costs and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) |
Key Cases Cited
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (held closely held for-profit corporations can assert RFRA objections and suggested extending the accommodation to such entities)
- Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (remanded to explore whether accommodation could be modified to address religious objections while preserving access)
- Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (2013) (live controversy requirement—must exist through all litigation stages)
- Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016) (reiterating that an actual controversy must persist)
- Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 (1990) (mootness where statutory amendment removes the complained-of defect)
- Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (regulation amendment can render challenge moot)
- N.E. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (injunction against repeal of ordinance would be meaningless when ordinance no longer in effect)
- Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992) (no effectual relief when challenged policy has been removed)