Timothy L. Hahn v. State of Indiana
67 N.E.3d 1071
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- On Aug. 30, 2013, Timothy Hahn was involved in an altercation in a bar parking lot during which he retrieved and used a baseball bat, striking Doug Shaw multiple times; Doug suffered serious injuries. Hahn and a passenger left the scene; police later stopped and arrested him.
- Hahn was initially charged (Cause No. 27) with battery by means of a deadly weapon (class C felony); that information was later dismissed and refiled in Cause No. 40 charging aggravated battery (class B), resisting law enforcement (class D), and OWI endangering (misdemeanor).
- Hahn moved for discharge under Ind. Crim. R. 4(B), claiming his speedy-trial right was violated; the trial court denied the motion and scheduled trial after a series of hearings, counsel changes, and a temporary erroneous release from custody.
- Hahn also moved to dismiss Counts I–II under the successive-prosecution statute (Ind. Code § 35-41-4-4), arguing his OWI conviction in a separate Cause No. 341 arose from the same conduct and therefore Counts I–II should have been joined previously; the court denied the motion.
- At trial Hahn claimed self-defense; he offered jury instructions on attempt and accomplice liability which the court refused, instead giving a self-defense instruction that it held encompassed his theory. The jury convicted Hahn of aggravated battery (class B) and acquitted him of resisting law enforcement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Hahn) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court erred denying discharge under Ind. Crim. R. 4(B) (speedy-trial) | The defendant waived/abandoned an earlier 70-day request by accepting and not objecting to later trial settings; Rule 4(B) applies only while incarcerated | Hahn asserted his earlier speedy-trial demand remained effective; his temporary release should only toll the 70-day period and not waive his rights | Court: No error. Hahn waived the initial 70-day request (or abandoned it by making a later request) and was released before 70 days expired so Rule 4(B) no longer applied |
| Whether successive-prosecution statute barred prosecution of Counts I–II (joinder issue) | The OWI was a separate misdemeanor and could be (and was) handled in city court; the felony charges were distinct and not required to be joined with the OWI | The OWI conviction in Cause No. 341 derived from the same conduct and the State should have charged all offenses together, barring later prosecution under § 35-41-4-4 | Court: No abuse of discretion. Hahn failed to prove Cause No. 341 involved the same post-incident conduct; record did not establish the offenses should have been joined |
| Whether the court erred in refusing instructions on attempt and accomplice liability | Instruction not required; self-defense instruction given sufficed to present Hahn’s theory; attempt/accomplice instructions would confuse jury about uncharged actors | Hahn argued attempt/accomplice instructions were necessary to show that bottle-throwing by others (or attempted felony by them) justified his use of deadly force in self-defense | Court: No abuse of discretion. Jury instructions as a whole (including self-defense) adequately allowed Hahn to argue his theory and did not misstate law |
Key Cases Cited
- Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 2013) (purpose and review standards for Crim. R. 4 challenges)
- Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. 1997) (Crim. R. 4(B) applies only to defendants incarcerated on the charge)
- Williams v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 2002) (contemporaneous crimes may form a single scheme and must be joined; test for single scheme)
- Minneman v. State, 441 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. 1982) (a later Rule 4(B) request can abandon an earlier request)
- Seay v. State, 550 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. 1990) (successive prosecutions not automatically barred for separate offenses in same episode)