TIMOTHY GLENN ROSE v. BETHANY DAWN CLARK, F/K/A BETHANY DAWN ROSE, A21A0172

Rose and Clark divorced in 2014; their incorporated settlement agreement required shared custody, Rose paying $518/month child support, and the parties to split private school tuition; the agreement survived the decree and could be modified only by written consent or court order.
In 2018 Clark petitioned for contempt alleging Rose failed to pay half the child’s tuition and maintain a life-insurance policy; Rose filed counterclaims and a separate modification/contempt petition; the matters were consolidated.
After an evidentiary hearing the trial court found Rose owed a net tuition arrearage ($4,966.95) and had an ongoing tuition obligation for 2019–2020 ($7,630).
The court modified Rose’s monthly child support to $1,048 (including a $225.39 deviation for extraordinary educational expenses) after finding both parents’ incomes had substantially changed and imputing income to Clark.
The court awarded Clark $10,050.47 in attorney fees but did not identify the statutory basis for the award or make supporting factual findings.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the contempt finding and the child-support modification/deviation, but vacated and remanded the attorney-fee award for lack of statutory grounding and factual findings.

Issue	Rose's Argument	Clark's Argument	Held
Contempt for unpaid tuition (breach of settlement incorporated into decree)	Tuition term arose from settlement (not support worksheet) and was modifiable; therefore contempt improper	Decree incorporated the settlement; failure to pay the settlement term violated the decree and supports contempt	Affirmed: incorporation made the tuition obligation part of the decree; evidence supported contempt finding
Modification of child support and upward income adjustment (including $225.39 tuition deviation)	Court improperly shifted tuition burden back to Rose by increasing support and deviating for tuition inconsistent with settlement	Court found substantial changes in both parents’ finances, imputed income to Clark, and properly exercised statutory discretion to deviate for extraordinary educational expenses	Affirmed: evidence supported finding of changed financial circumstances and allowed deviation with written findings
Attorney-fee award of $10,050.47	Award lacked identified statutory basis and factual findings; thus invalid	Clark asserted entitlement (by counterclaim) under applicable fee statutes (trial court did not specify)	Vacated and remanded: trial court failed to state statutory basis or make required factual findings to support fees

Hartley-Selvey v. Hartley, 261 Ga. 700 (410 SE2d 118) (settlement provision requiring shared tuition binds divorced parties)
Ruskin v. AAF-McQuay Inc., 294 Ga. App. 842 (670 SE2d 517) (disobedience of a court order may constitute contempt)
Park-Poaps v. Poaps, 351 Ga. App. 856 (833 SE2d 554) (trial court’s contempt determinations reviewed for any supporting evidence)
Hardman v. Hardman, 295 Ga. 732 (763 SE2d 861) (parties can contract to split tuition and court may deviate from support guidelines with findings)
Kinsala v. Hair, 324 Ga. App. 1 (747 SE2d 887) (awards under OCGA § 9-15-14 require express findings and the statutory subsection cited)
Amoakuh v. Issaka, 299 Ga. 132 (786 SE2d 678) (awards under OCGA § 19-6-2 require findings about parties’ relative financial circumstances)
Viskup v. Viskup, 291 Ga. 103 (727 SE2d 97) (remand required where record does not disclose statutory basis or findings supporting fee award)