Timmie Cole, Sr. v. J. Ray Ormond
917 F.3d 515
| 6th Cir. | 2019Background
- Five federal prisoners (Samarripa, Mason, Hernandez, Perez, Cole) filed § 2241 habeas petitions and paid the $5 district-court filing fee; all petitions were denied on the merits.
- Each filed a timely notice of appeal and a motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis seeking waiver of the $505 appellate filing fee.
- District courts granted pauper status in part, ordering one-time partial prepayments: $50 (Samarripa, Cole), $350 (Hernandez), $400 (Mason, Perez).
- Appellants appealed the partial-payment orders to the Sixth Circuit, which consolidated the motions and appointed counsel; the government and appellants initially agreed district courts lacked authority to require partial prepayment.
- The central legal question: whether 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) permits district courts to require partial prepayment of appellate filing fees (as opposed to full waiver or full prepayment).
- The Sixth Circuit reviewed statutory text, historical circuit practice, Rule 24, the PLRA context, and gave deference to district courts’ factual findings on each appellant’s ability to pay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1915(a)(1) allows district courts to require partial prepayment of appellate filing fees | Appellants: § 1915(a)(1) requires either full waiver or denial; no authority to require partial payment | Amicus/Government: § 1915(a)(1) is discretionary and historically courts have imposed partial prepayments | Court: § 1915(a)(1) permits district courts to require partial prepayment; historical practice and statutory context support discretion |
| Whether Rule 24 limits district courts to an all-or-nothing ruling on pauper motions | Appellants: Rule 24 contemplates grant or denial only; partial grants would frustrate appellate procedures | Government: Rule 24 does not preclude in‑part orders; courts may grant/delay/condition pauper status | Court: Rule 24 does not bar partial grants; district courts may condition pauper status on partial prepayment |
| Whether the PLRA § 1915(b) precludes district courts from ordering partial prepayment in habeas appeals | Appellants/Govt: PLRA’s mandatory partial-payment scheme shows Congress intended limited judicial discretion; thus § 1915(a)(1) no longer allows partial payments | Amicus: PLRA governs prisoners’ payments generally and may apply to some appeals; but PLRA expressly covers prisoner civil actions and certain appeals | Court: PLRA does not clearly abrogate § 1915(a)(1) discretion for habeas § 2241 appeals here; question unresolved for future cases but does not alter result now |
| Whether district courts abused discretion in the specific partial-fee amounts ordered | Appellants: district courts erred in amount or process | Government: district courts considered finances and acted within discretion | Court: affirmed the specific partial prepayment amounts; no error identified in district courts’ factual determinations |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Ames, 99 U.S. 35 (broad discretion over security for costs supports judicial discretion)
- In re Epps, 888 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1989) (pre-1996 circuit practice allowing partial prepayments)
- Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing § 1915(a) to permit partial fee payments)
- Longbehn v. United States, 169 F.3d 1082 (7th Cir. 1999) (approving district court’s use of PLRA 20% formula for habeas appeal partial prepayment)
- Garza v. Thaler, 585 F.3d 888 (5th Cir. 2009) (contrary holding that district court may not grant pauper status yet require partial payment)
- Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 335 U.S. 331 (1948) (attorney financial affidavits; distinguished)
- Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (statutory-drafting differences can signal differing meanings)
- Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174 (characterization of habeas proceedings)
- Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (habeas is unique; labels civil/criminal can be imprecise)