Timbie v. Eli Lilly & Co.
429 F. App'x 20
2d Cir.2011Background
- Timbie sued Eli Lilly under the ADEA and CFEPA for age discrimination.
- The district court granted Lilly's summary-judgment motion in full on July 14, 2010.
- Timbie appealed to the Second Circuit alleging improper summary-judgment analysis.
- The court reviews discrimination claims de novo under McDonnell Douglas framework with a but-for standard after Gross.
- Material dispute centered on Lilly's performance criteria: 85% vs 100% quota and whether meeting 100% was required for bonuses/raises.
- Affidavits (including Elliott) and a remark by a supervisor (Boston) were argued as probative evidence of pretext or discrimination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper summary judgment standard in discrimination case? | Timbie contends the district court misweighed evidence and misapplied the standard. | Lilly argues the court correctly applied de novo review and summary-judgment standards. | No reversible error; standard applied correctly. |
| Whether Lilly's reasons were pretext for age discrimination under McDonnell Douglas? | Timbie argues Lilly's reasons were pretextual and age-driven. | Lilly asserts its reasons were legitimate and non-discriminatory. | Timbie failed to show but-for discrimination. |
| Admissibility and weight of Elliott Affidavit. | Elliott affidavit should raise genuine issue of fact. | Affidavit is conclusory and inadmissible under Rule 56 and 701. | District court did not abuse by declining to credit Elliott affidavit. |
| Consideration of Boston remark as direct evidence of discrimination. | Remark shows discriminatory intent related to pay/raises. | Remark is not probative enough to establish but-for causation. | Remark insufficient to prove but-for discrimination. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary-judgment scrutiny in discrimination cases)
- Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (but-for causation framework in ADEA discrimination)
- Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) (relevance of discriminatory intent in summary judgment)
- Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (Supreme Court 2009) (age discrimination must be but-for cause, not factors)
- D’Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 1998) (summary-judgment standard applicable on appeal)
- Global Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 562 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2009) (burden on summary judgment under 56(a))
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court 1986) (minimal showing required; metaphysical doubt insufficient)
- Zelnik v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 464 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2006) (requiring more than conclusory allegations to support summary judgment)
- Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (court defers to business judgments absent pretext)
- Henry v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2010) (factors for evaluating discriminatory remarks)
- Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2007) (context of remarks in discrimination analysis)
- Hayes v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Conn. 2004) (statutory analysis of CFEPA and ADEA alignment)