Tikidanke Bah v. Mac's Convenience Stores, LLC d/b/a Circle K and David Ruffin
2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 496
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Bah, a Circle K store manager, was terminated after Ruffin suspected she stole $1,500 and the police were contacted.
- Bah was charged with theft but the jury later acquitted her in March 2010.
- Bah sued Circle K and Ruffin (Appellees) on eight counts including false imprisonment, defamation, malicious prosecution, negligent supervision, vicarious liability, IIED, and NIED.
- Appellees moved to strike Bah’s designated evidence and to grant summary judgment; the trial court granted both.
- On appeal, Bah challenged both the strike and the summary judgment orders; the appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of strike objections | Bah argues trial court erred granting strike on procedural/substantive grounds. | Appellees contend Bah waived by not objecting and consenting at hearing. | Waived; arguments lacking timely objection consents defeat review. |
| Summary judgment on negligent claims | Bah contends denial of summary judgment on negligent supervision and NIED is warranted. | Appellees maintain these claims fail; Bah withdrew negligent supervision and NIED fails as a matter of law. | Negligent supervision withdrawn; NIED fails as a matter of law. |
| Malicious prosecution | Bah asserts Malicious Prosecution due to Ruffin’s actions and communications to police. | Prosecutor, not Appellees, instituted the action; no probable cause issue created by Appellees. | Appellees entitled to summary judgment on malicious prosecution. |
| Qualified privilege and remaining claims | Bah argues Ruffin’s communications to IMPD were not privileged or abused; states claim persists for non-privileged publications. | Appellees claim communications to police are qualifiedly privileged; abuse issues require jury; state-of-mind issues remain. | Not entitled to summary judgment on remaining claims; issue of privilege abuse for trial. |
| Intentional infliction of emotional distress | Bah asserts IIED from Ruffin’s conduct and reporting to police. | Appellees argue conduct is not extreme/outrageous as a matter of law; depends on state of mind and severity. | Remanded for trial on IIED; genuine issues of material fact exist. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756 (Ind.2009) (qualified privilege and abuse questions for jury; state of mind not grounds to resolve summary judgment)
- Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593 (Ind.2007) (qualified privilege defense for statements to law enforcement; abuse requires proof)
- Brown v. Indianapolis Housing Agency, 971 N.E.2d 181 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (defamation and IIED implications; privilege may apply to certain publications)
- Lachenman v. Stice, 838 N.E.2d 451 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (direct physical impact requirement for NIED; governs viability of NIED claim)
- Curry v. Whitaker, 943 N.E.2d 354 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (IIED elements; demands extreme and outrageous conduct; rigorous standard)
- Reichhart v. City of New Haven, 748 N.E.2d 374 (Ind.2001) (malicious prosecution elements and termination in plaintiff’s favor)
- Street v. Shoe Carnival, Inc., 660 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (probable cause in false imprisonment; prima facie evidence and possible rebuttal)
- Conwell v. Beatty, 667 N.E.2d 768 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (prosecution and privilege context relevant to publication)
- Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA, Inc., 929 N.E.2d 184 (Ind.2010) (defamation per se framework and recovery limits)