Thurston v. Omni Hotels Management Corporation, 69 Cal.App.5th 299

Plaintiff Cheryl Thurston is blind and uses screen‑reader software; she visited Omni Hotels’ website multiple times (2015–2019) seeking a room in Palm Springs or San Diego and encountered reservation‑function accessibility problems.
Thurston did not complete any reservation, did not call or email Omni, did not use third‑party travel sites, and did not book other hotels on those visits.
Experts testified that her navigation problems could be attributed to an outdated browser/screen reader and limited user proficiency; Omni had recently undertaken efforts to make its site WCAG‑compliant and offered alternate booking methods (phone, email, in‑person, third‑party sites).
The trial court gave a hybrid jury instruction requiring proof that Thurston “attempted to use Omni’s website for the purpose of making a hotel reservation (or to ascertain Omni’s prices and accommodations for the purpose of considering whether to make a hotel reservation).”
The jury found Omni operated the reservation website and that Thurston is blind, but found she did not attempt to use the site for the purpose of making a reservation; judgment for Omni followed.
Thurston appealed, arguing (1) the court erred by requiring proof of intent to make a reservation and (2) the special verdict’s use of the word “purpose” improperly asked jurors to decide her motivation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the jury instruction requiring that Thurston intended to make a hotel reservation was improper	Thurston: Unruh (as incorporating ADA Title III) does not require plaintiff to be a customer or show intent/motivation to use services; intent is irrelevant to ADA/Unruh liability	Omni: Under White and related authority, an online Unruh plaintiff must show a bona fide intent to use the business’s services; the jury may decide whether plaintiff actually intended to use the services	Held: No error. Court distinguished standing from merits; White allows standing at pleading stage but permits defendant to dispute bona fide intent at trial, so instruction was proper
Whether including the word "purpose" on the special verdict form improperly asked jurors to find Thurston’s motivation	Thurston: The wording forced a factual finding about her subjective motivation, which is not required to prove an ADA‑based Unruh claim	Omni: The wording accurately tracked the trial issue—whether Thurston attempted to use the site to make a reservation—and was a proper inquiry into bona fide intent	Held: No error. The word "purpose" was permissible because the jury was resolving whether Thurston actually intended to use the site (a merits fact), not a standing question

White v. Square, Inc., 7 Cal.5th 1019 (California Supreme Court 2019) (a person who visits a business’s website with intent to use its services and encounters exclusionary terms has standing, but defendant may challenge plaintiff’s bona fide intent at trial)
Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, 41 Cal.4th 160 (California Supreme Court 2007) (Unruh Act’s remedial purpose and broad construction to prohibit discrimination by business establishments)
Jankey v. Lee, 55 Cal.4th 1038 (California Supreme Court 2012) (identifies Unruh and Disabled Persons Act as principal state disability access protections)
Munson v. Del Taco, 46 Cal.4th 661 (California Supreme Court 2009) (an Unruh claim based on an ADA violation does not require proof of intentional discrimination)
Civil Rights Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Hospitality Props. Tr., 867 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2017) (motivation irrelevant to Title III standing; plaintiffs may test facilities for ADA compliance)
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (U.S. Supreme Court 2001) (Title III’s language reaches individuals broadly; relied on in arguments about ADA coverage)