65 A.3d 730
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2013Background
- Thurman was charged in Prince George’s County Circuit Court with multiple offenses including attempted murder, armed carjacking, and use of a handgun; she was convicted of first-degree assault, armed carjacking, use of a handgun, and wearing and carrying a handgun, with certain sentences concurrent and wearing and carrying merged for sentencing.
- Thurman appealed raising two issues: (1) whether defense could impeach the victim’s credibility with prior police-officer related convictions, and (2) whether defense could re-cross examine a State’s witness after redirect.
- Cedric Bosier testified; Thurman’s defense sought to impeach him with prior convictions for assault on a police officer, threats to do bodily harm, and reckless endangerment.
- The trial court sustained objections to those impeaching convictions and, after proffer, ruled they were not crimes of moral turpitude and thus not admissible under Rule 5-609.
- The State argued none of the convictions were felonies, infamous crimes, or crimen falsi, and thus not admissible to impeach credibility; the court agreed and excluded them.
- During trial, the court announced a policy that it did not permit recross after redirect; Thurman sought limited recross on a redirect matter, which the court refused, prompting this appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Impeachment relevancy of officer-related convictions | Bosier’s convictions for assault on a police officer and fleeing law enforcement are relevant to credibility. | Those convictions are not felonies or crimen falsi and do not bear on credibility under Rule 5-609. | Trial court did not err in excluding the convictions as impeachment evidence. |
| Right to recross after redirect when new matters arise | Thurman should be allowed limited recross to test redirect testimony on a newly raised matter. | Court has discretion to control interrogation and may deny recross after redirect. | The court abused its discretion in blanketly prohibiting recross, but the error was harmless. |
Key Cases Cited
- Westpoint, 404 Md. 455 (Md. 2008) (credibility relevance of crimes measured by elements; crimen falsi non-crimenes)
- Giddens, 335 Md. 205 (Md. 1994) (credibility bearing by crime elements; general lack of bearing for some offenses)
- Duckett, 306 Md. 503 (Md. 1986) (violence offenses often have little bearing on honesty)
- Fulp v. State, 130 Md.App. 157 (Md. Ct. App. 2000) (assault offenses not inherently probative of truthfulness for impeachment)
- Dyson v. State, 328 Md. 490 (Md. 1992) (recross rights when recalled witness asked during deliberations)
- Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332 (Md. 1997) (court errs when applying uniform discretionary rule to discrete cases)
- Caudle, 606 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1979) ( recross remedy when new matter arises on redirect; confrontation concern)
- Riggi, 951 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1991) (Sixth Amendment requires recross on new redirect matters)