Thurman v. Champaign Park Dist.
960 N.E.2d 18
Ill. App. Ct.2011Background
- Thurmans sued Champaign Park District for Lucas’s injuries sustained playing tennis at the District’s facility; plaintiffs alleged the tarp obscured a structural beam causing collision injuries.
- Plaintiff alleged the District, with utter indifference or conscious disregard, failed to warn about concealed beams, failed to provide a safe court, failed to use ordinary care, failed to provide adequate lighting, and failed to pad beams.
- The District moved to dismiss under 2-619.1, arguing immunity under 3-106, failure to plead willful and wanton conduct, open/obvious condition, and Spencer affidavit supporting safety-conscious conduct.
- The trial court granted 2-615 dismissal without prejudice and then 2-619 dismissal with prejudice, finding no willful and wanton conduct pled.
- On appeal, Thurmans maintained the complaint stated a claim for willful and wanton conduct; Champaign Park District argued the allegations were ordinary negligence immunized by 3-106.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the complaint pled willful and wanton conduct under the Act. | Thurman argues facts show conscious disregard. | Champaign Park District maintains only ordinary negligence pleaded. | No; allegations insufficient to show willful/wanton; immunized under 3-106. |
| Whether the Act’s statutory definition of willful and wanton applies in tort-immunity cases. | Plaintiff argues common-law standards apply. | Defendant argues statutory definition governs. | Statutory definition applies, excluding conflicting common-law definitions. |
| Whether Spencer’s affidavit can support a 2-619 dismissal and show lack of willful/wanton. | Affidavit is not properly used to defeat willful/wanton claim. | Affidavit establishes safety-conscious conduct and distances/conditions. | Yes; affidavit supports dismissal as a matter of law; no genuine issue of willful/wanton. |
| Whether Oelze is distinguishable and supports or defeats the claim. | Oelze supports inference of conscious disregard. | Oelze is distinguishable and not controlling here. | Distinguishable; not controlling. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kean v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 235 Ill.2d 351 (2009) (2-615 vs 2-619; standard of de novo review)
- Loman v. Freeman, 229 Ill.2d 104 (2008) (2-615 standard; well-pleaded facts reviewable on face of complaint)
- Tedrick v. Community Resource Center, Inc., 235 Ill.2d 155 (2009) (necessity to plead legally recognized cause of action)
- K. Miller Construction Co. v. McGinnis, 238 Ill.2d 284 (2010) (2-615/2-619 standard; judicial notice of pleadings)
- Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill.2d 213 (2007) (willful/wanton definition prior to 1998 amendment)
- Winfrey v. Chicago Park District, 274 Ill.App.3d 939 (1995) (willful/wanton allegations insufficient where lack of facts show utter indifference)
- Floyd v. Rockford Park District, 355 Ill.App.3d 695 (2005) (willful/wanton standard for a public-park setting)
- Tagliere v. Western Springs Park District, 408 Ill.App.3d 235 (2011) (statutory definition of willful and wanton governs tort-immunity cases)
- Oelze v. Score Sports Venture, LLC, 401 Ill.App.3d 110 (2010) (distinguishable; not controlling on Act-definitional questions)
- Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill.2d 359 (2003) (immunity under the Act as affirmative matter in 2-619)