250 A.3d 295
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2021Background
- Thornton Mellon, LLC purchased a tax-sale certificate for Dennis’s Walkersville home in May 2019 and could file to foreclose the right of redemption after six months.
- Dennis sought payoff information Nov. 12–14, 2019; Thornton Mellon’s website initially showed pre-suit fees of $779.76, then (erroneously) added post‑suit fees before correcting the invoice; Dennis paid $779.76 on Nov. 14.
- Thornton Mellon provided a release that was stamped “EXPIRED”; county staff queried the expiration and Thornton Mellon’s counsel told the county the release would be honored, but Dennis did not receive that clarification before the county closed.
- The next morning Thornton Mellon’s counsel emailed Dennis demanding post‑suit fees and filed a complaint to foreclose the right of redemption at 10:06 a.m.; Dennis later paid the county all taxes/charges and sought a court determination as to additional fees.
- The circuit court found Thornton Mellon’s errors (incorrect invoice, expired release, misleading demand) impeded Dennis’s opportunity to redeem, denied Thornton Mellon’s requests for statutory and extraordinary attorney’s fees, dismissed the foreclosure complaint as moot, and Dennis appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Thornton Mellon) | Defendant's Argument (Dennis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether dismissal was improper because property was not fully redeemed | Dismissal was premature; complaint could validly be filed and fees sought | Redemption was complete once Dennis paid all statutory amounts except disputed post‑filing fees; denial of those fees left no basis to foreclose | Affirmed: trial court properly denied fee claims and dismissal was appropriate because no redemption amount remained in dispute |
| Whether TP §14‑843 mandates reimbursement of $1,500 after filing (no discretion) | The statute’s “shall be deemed reasonable” language makes the $1,500 reimbursement mandatory once complaint/affidavit filed | The statute’s use of “may be reimbursed” gives courts discretion to deny reimbursement in appropriate circumstances | Held: statute grants trial courts discretion; “shall be deemed reasonable” fixes amount if reimbursement is awarded but does not compel awarding fees in every case |
| Whether Thornton Mellon’s conduct impeded Dennis’s redemption rights | Dennis was able or unwilling to redeem; Thornton Mellon’s communications didn’t prevent redemption | Thornton Mellon’s erroneous invoice, expired release, and misleading demand reasonably impeded Dennis’s ability to redeem | Held: trial court’s factual finding that Thornton Mellon’s errors impeded redemption is supported by the record and not clearly erroneous |
| Whether trial court abused discretion in denying extraordinary attorney’s fees without merits analysis | Court refused to exercise discretion on extraordinary fees and should have reviewed merits | Extraordinary fees flowed from the complaint; because court permissibly denied reimbursement as inequitable, extraordinary fees were properly denied | Held: no abuse of discretion; denial of extraordinary fees was consistent with court’s equitable decision to deny all fee reimbursement |
Key Cases Cited
- Dawson v. Prince George’s County, 324 Md. 481 (1991) (statutory framework for redemption and foreclosure procedure)
- Deinlein v. Johnson, 201 Md. App. 373 (2011) (§14‑843 governs repayment of attorney’s fees on redemption)
- Heartwood 88, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 156 Md. App. 333 (2004) (redemption prerequisite to entitlement to attorney’s fees)
- Brodsky v. Brodsky, 319 Md. 92 (1990) (interpretation of "may" as permissive language in statutes)
- Friolo v. Frankel, 403 Md. 443 (2008) (discretion to award attorneys’ fees under permissive statutory language)
- Scheve v. McPherson, 44 Md. App. 398 (1979) (certificate holder must allow reasonable time and not unreasonably frustrate redemption)