274 A.3d 380
Md.2022Background
- Thornton Mellon bought a tax sale certificate for Dennis’s Frederick County home (sale May 13, 2019); the earliest date to file to foreclose redemption was Nov. 14, 2019.
- On Nov. 12–14 Dennis sought payoff figures; Thornton Mellon’s online invoice initially showed $779.76 (including $500 attorney fee), then displayed $2,000.88 (including $1,500 for a complaint that had not been filed).
- Dennis paid $801.20 to Thornton Mellon on Nov. 14 and received a release labeled “EXPIRED” (no expiration date); county staff and Thornton Mellon exchanged e-mails indicating the release could be accepted, but Dennis lacked a practical opportunity to redeem before the county closed.
- Thornton Mellon filed a complaint to foreclose on Nov. 15, 2019, seeking higher attorney fees; Dennis answered, alleged Thornton Mellon impeded redemption, and later redeemed after the hearing.
- The circuit court denied Thornton Mellon’s statutory and “exceptional circumstances” fee requests, finding Thornton Mellon’s errors deprived Dennis of a meaningful opportunity to redeem; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed; the Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Thornton Mellon) | Defendant's Argument (Dennis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether reimbursement under TP §14-843(a)(4)(i) is mandatory or discretionary | Statute’s sentence that $1,500 “shall be deemed reasonable” makes fee reimbursement mandatory once complaint filed | The statute’s repeated use of “may be reimbursed” makes awards discretionary | Discretionary: the statute’s use of “may” is permissive; amounts “shall be deemed reasonable” apply only if court awards fees |
| Whether a court may consider certificate-holder conduct (e.g., impeding redemption) when denying fees | Certificate holder need not delay filing once six months passed; courts shouldn’t bar fees absent proof owner could pay at filing | Court may consider whether holder impeded or hindered redemption; equitable denial appropriate where holder’s conduct blocked meaningful redemption | Court may consider holder’s conduct; trial court did not err in denying fees where holder’s errors impeded redemption |
| Legitimacy and scope of so-called “impeded redemption” concept; burden of proof (must owner prove funds existed at filing) | If impeded-redemption recognized, owner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that funds existed when complaint filed | No rigid requirement to prove funds; statute and legislative intent protect redemption and do not require such a showing | No new doctrine created; courts can deny fees on equitable grounds without imposing strict proof-of-funds requirement |
| Whether trial court abused discretion denying “exceptional circumstances” fees under TP §14-843(a)(4)(iii) | Exceptional-fee requests arose from litigation conduct and discovery; court should consider them on merits | Court reasonably denied all fees because complaint was tainted by holder’s interference; awarding exceptional fees would be inequitable | No abuse of discretion: (a)(4)(iii) is discretionary and trial court permissibly denied exceptional fees given holder’s conduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Uthus v. Valley Mill Camp, Inc., 246 A.3d 1225 (Md. 2021) (statutory use of “may” is permissive/discretionary)
- WSC/2005 LLC v. Trio Ventures Assocs., 190 A.3d 255 (Md. 2018) (awarding fees under permissive statutory language is discretionary)
- Sabisch v. Moyer, 220 A.3d 272 (Md. 2019) (appellate review of statutory interpretation is de novo)
- Mercer v. Thomas B. Finan Ctr., 265 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2021) (statutory-construction principles and effect of unambiguous text)
- Kona Props., LLC v. W.D.B. Corp., 121 A.3d 191 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (post-2008 amendments shifted emphasis to encourage redemption)
- Scheve v. McPherson, 408 A.2d 1071 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (certificate holders must act reasonably and allow a reasonable time to redeem)