212 A.3d 340
Me.2019Background
- Thornton Academy and 31 Arundel residents sued RSU 21 after RSU 21 adopted a resolution (March 2016) that, upon expiration of Arundel School Department’s (ASD) contract with Thornton Academy, required Arundel middle school students to attend the Middle School of the Kennebunks (MSK) and denied public funding for attendance at Thornton.
- ASD had a ten-year exclusive contract (from 2006) sending Arundel grades 6–8 to Thornton; ASD merged into RSU 21 in 2009; the contract expired in 2016 and RSU 21 declined to renew it.
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and Rule 80B review, arguing 20-A M.R.S. § 1479(3)(A) preserves students’ right to attend the formerly contracted school at public expense after contract expiration.
- RSU 21 counterclaimed, asserting § 1479(3)(A) preserves only prior school choice (i.e., a preexisting ability to choose among schools), and because ASD’s contract was exclusive, no school choice existed and RSU 21 need not fund Thornton attendance post-expiration.
- The Superior Court held § 1479(3)(A) requires RSU 21 to allow Arundel middle school students to attend Thornton Academy at public expense after the contract expired; RSU 21 appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does 20-A M.R.S. § 1479(3)(A) preserve the students’ right to attend the formerly contracted school at public expense after contract expiration? | § 1479(3)(A) preserves the prior “option” to attend the contracted school (Thornton) — i.e., the right/opportunity to attend at public expense. | “Option” means prior school choice only; because ASD’s contract was exclusive, students had no choice originally, so RSU 21 need not continue funding Thornton attendance. | Court: “Option” means the opportunity/right to attend the former contract school and applies whenever a school-privileges contract expires and is not renewed, regardless of whether the original contract was exclusive. |
| Does RSU 21’s interpretation render other statutory provisions surplusage or create a statutory gap? | N/A (plaintiffs argue a broad reading harmonizes the statute). | RSU 21’s narrow reading limits subsection 3(A) to nonexclusive contracts. | Court: RSU 21’s reading creates a gap and would render §1479(4) or §1479(3)(A) surplusage; reject that interpretation. |
| Is the court permitted to enforce a possibly indefinite continuation of funding absent legislative time limits? | N/A (plaintiffs sought statutory remedy). | RSU 21 claims the statute’s plain language has no temporal limit and that perpetuity is improper policy. | Court: Enforces plain statutory language without imposing temporal limits; policy concerns are for the Legislature. |
| Was the equitable estoppel claim necessary after the statutory interpretation? | Plaintiffs also pleaded equitable estoppel based on prior RSU representations. | RSU 21 moved to dismiss that claim. | Court: Equitable estoppel claim rendered moot by statutory ruling; dismissal appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wawenock, LLC v. Dep’t of Transp., 187 A.3d 609 (Me. 2018) (statutory interpretation starts with plain language; interpret de novo)
- Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 37 v. Pineo, 988 A.2d 987 (Me. 2010) (use plain language to discern legislative intent)
- S.D. Warren Co. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 868 A.2d 210 (Me. 2005) (give statutory words their ordinary meaning)
- Joyce v. State, 951 A.2d 69 (Me. 2008) (do not imply statutory limitations where none appear)
- Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof’ls Licensure, 896 A.2d 271 (Me. 2006) (avoid interpretations that render statutory language surplusage)
- Smith v. Hawthorne, 892 A.2d 433 (Me. 2006) (policy choices belong to the Legislature; courts apply plain statutory text)