84 F.4th 42
1st Cir.2023Background
- Spring 2020: Sean Burt and Logan Thomson were enrolled at the University of Rhode Island (URI); they paid tuition plus mandatory fees (student services fee composed of student activities, Memorial Union, Fitness & Wellness Center, transportation, capital projects; plus technology and health services fees).
- In March 2020 URI moved in-person classes online, closed campus facilities, and required most students to vacate housing after Rhode Island pandemic emergency orders; URI refunded 25% of housing/meal-plan charges but gave no tuition or fee refunds.
- Burt and Thomson filed putative class actions seeking pro-rated refunds for tuition and fees, asserting breach of contract (express and implied) and unjust enrichment; suits were consolidated and litigated in federal court under Rhode Island law.
- District court (1) dismissed tuition claims (no enforceable express promise; implied claims rejected via frustration defense), (2) declined to dismiss some fee claims at motion-to-dismiss, but (3) after discovery granted URI summary judgment on all fee claims and unjust enrichment claims, finding either no contractual obligation or that contracts were substantially frustrated and/or services were provided in alternative form.
- First Circuit affirmed: it reached similar ultimate results though with different reasoning on implied tuition contracts and on which fee components could plausibly create implied obligations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an express contract for in-person tuition-based instruction existed | Plaintiffs: catalog/website/marketing and prior in-person course of dealing promised in-person, on-campus instruction in exchange for tuition | URI: catalog language was promotional/aspirational; no explicit promise of exclusive in-person instruction | No express tuition contract; plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege an express promise of exclusive in-person instruction |
| Whether an implied tuition contract existed and whether performance was excused by frustration | Plaintiffs: implied contract arose from course of dealing, promotional materials, and expectations that tuition buys in-person education | URI: no binding implied promise; even if so, pandemic/emergency orders made performance impracticable | Plaintiffs plausibly alleged an implied tuition contract, but the pandemic and governor's emergency orders substantially frustrated those contracts; frustration was established at motion-to-dismiss, so implied tuition claims were dismissed |
| Whether fee descriptions created express or implied contractual obligations to provide in-person access to specific facilities/services (student services components, technology, health) | Plaintiffs: fees "cover" or "support" campus facilities/services, creating reasonable expectation of in-person access to those facilities (Memorial Union, Fitness Center, shuttle, etc.) | URI: phrases like "covers the cost" and "supports" are too general to promise in-person access; many fee-funded activities can be provided virtually or adapted | No express fee contracts obligating exclusive in-person access. Implied contracts could plausibly exist for Memorial Union, Fitness Center, and transportation portions (genuine factual disputes), but not for student activities, capital projects, technology, or health services (no breach shown for health) |
| Whether plaintiffs can recover under unjust enrichment for retained tuition/fees | Plaintiffs: restitution required because URI retained tuition/fees while providing an inferior or different product and curtailed services | URI: used fee funds to provide alternative services and cover costs; plaintiffs offer no evidence URI was unjustly enriched | Summary judgment for URI: plaintiffs failed to produce evidence creating a genuine dispute that URI was unjustly enriched; unjust enrichment claims fail |
Key Cases Cited
- Marshall Contractors, Inc. v. Brown Univ., 692 A.2d 665 (R.I. 1997) (implied contracts may be found from the parties' relations, communications, and course of dealing)
- Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (university publications and handbooks inform student–university contractual expectations)
- Lyons v. Salve Regina Coll., 565 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1977) (interpret catalog language by its ordinary meaning)
- Shaffer v. George Washington Univ., 27 F.4th 754 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (historic on-campus practice can support inference of an implied promise of in-person instruction)
- Iannuccillo v. Material Sand & Stone Corp., 713 A.2d 1234 (R.I. 1998) (elements and test for substantial frustration of contract)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden-shifting framework)
- Barkan v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 627 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2010) (elements required to establish a breach of contract)
- Fiore v. Univ. of Tampa, 568 F. Supp. 3d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (fee language that "supports" programs does not necessarily guarantee in-person access)