293 F. Supp. 3d 1313
M.D. Ala.2017Background
- Alabama's Constitution (Art. VIII §177(b)) disenfranchises persons convicted of a "felony involving moral turpitude." Restoration requires completion of sentence including payment of all fines, costs, fees, and restitution under Ala. Code §15-22-36.1.
- Plaintiffs (individuals with felony convictions and an advocacy organization) filed a putative class action alleging constitutional and Voting Rights Act violations based on (a) the undefined phrase "moral turpitude," (b) the effect of disenfranchisement on Black voters, and (c) conditioning restoration on payment of legal financial obligations (LFOs).
- During the suit Alabama enacted HB 282 (Ala. Code §17-3-30.1), the Felony Voter Disqualification Act, which for the first time enumerated felonies considered to involve moral turpitude; the court previously found HB 282 mooted certain vagueness claims.
- The Complaint asserts 15 counts; the court resolves a Rule 12(b)(6) and sua sponte jurisdictional review and narrows the case to five surviving claims while dismissing others with or without prejudice.
- Counts proceeding: Intentional racial discrimination (Equal Protection and Fifteenth Amendment) against §177(b) (Counts 1–2); Ex Post Facto challenge to §177(b) (Count 11); Eighth Amendment challenge to §177(b) (Count 12); Equal Protection challenge to §15-22-36.1(a)(3) conditioning restoration on full payment of LFOs (Count 13).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §177(b) was enacted with racially discriminatory intent (Fourteenth & Fifteenth Amendments) | §177(b) continues the 1901 racially motivated disenfranchisement scheme; disparate impact on Black voters supports plausibility of intentional discrimination | Defendants rely on precedent (Johnson) and argue reenactment is lawful and not motivated by race | Survives 12(b)(6): pleadings plausibly allege discriminatory intent; Counts 1–2 proceed |
| Whether §177(b) violates §2 of the Voting Rights Act (results or purpose) | §177(b) results in racial denial/abridgement of the franchise | Defendants rely on Eleventh Circuit precedent holding §2 does not reach felon disenfranchisement (Johnson) | Dismissed: Count 3 barred by Johnson; §2 claim fails |
| Whether §177(b) triggers strict scrutiny as a fundamental-rights violation under Equal Protection | Plaintiffs urge strict scrutiny; argue "other crime" in §2 Fourteenth Amendment shouldn't include these offenses | Defendants invoke Richardson v. Ramirez to bar strict-scrutiny approach for felon disenfranchisement | Dismissed: Count 4 not legally cognizable; Richardson forecloses strict scrutiny |
| Whether §177(b) violates the First Amendment | Voting is protected speech; disenfranchisement for unrelated felonies burdens speech/association | Defendants cite Richardson and circuit authority that First Amendment does not create a freestanding right to vote for felons | Dismissed: Count 5 fails as a matter of law |
| Whether vagueness/due process challenges to "moral turpitude" survive after HB 282 | Plaintiffs argue phrase is vague and causes arbitrary disenfranchisement | Defendants point to HB 282 clarification and administrative guidance | Dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Counts 6–10 moot due to HB 282) |
| Whether §177(b) is punitive (Ex Post Facto) or cruel and unusual (Eighth Amendment) | Plaintiffs allege disenfranchisement is retroactive punishment and constitutes cruel/unusual punishment | Defendants argue disenfranchisement historically is nonpunitive and permitted (Trop/Supreme Court dicta) | Survives: Counts 11–12 proceed; court defers merits applying Smith v. Doe framework to later stages |
| Whether conditioning restoration on full payment of LFOs violates Equal Protection, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (poll tax), or §2 of the VRA | Plaintiffs: automatic restoration conditioned on ability to pay discriminates on wealth and disproportionately impacts Black citizens; poll tax and §2 claims alleged | Defendants: alternative pardon/clemency process and precedent (Johnson/Bredesen/Harvey) mean no unconstitutional poll tax or §2 liability; rational bases support the payment requirement | Equal Protection claim (Count 13) survives 12(b)(6); Twenty-Fourth Amendment poll-tax claim (Count 14) dismissed; §2 challenge to §15-22-36.1 (Count 15) dismissed under Johnson |
Key Cases Cited
- Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (U.S. 1985) (1901 Alabama provision was enacted with racially discriminatory intent)
- Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1974) (Felon disenfranchisement is constitutionally permitted; limits application of strict scrutiny)
- Johnson v. Governor of State of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (Eleventh Circuit held §2 of VRA does not reach felon-disenfranchisement provisions)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (Two-step intent-effects framework for determining whether a statute imposes punishment for ex post facto purposes)
- Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (U.S. 1977) (Factors for inferring discriminatory intent)
- Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (U.S. 1966) (State may not condition voting on wealth; poll tax doctrine)
- Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (U.S. 1958) (Historical analysis of punishment; discussion of disenfranchisement as nonpenal)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (Pleading standard—plausibility)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (Plausibility standard for complaints)