Thompson v. Runnel
621 F.3d 1007
9th Cir.2011Background
- Thompson confessed to killing his girlfriend in a custodial interrogation that began without Miranda warnings and continued for several hours.
- Thompson later provided post-Miranda confessions and participated in a videotaped reenactment after warnings were finally given.
- State courts admitted Thompson's postwarning statements and reenactment; they suppressed prewarning statements and relied on Oregon v. Elstad to affirm admissibility of the later statements.
- Thompson challenged the post-Miranda statements in federal habeas corpus under AEDPA; the district court denied relief and the Ninth Circuit initially denied rehearing, with a split on whether Seibert controlled.
- The court discusses whether Seibert or Elstad governs AEDPA review, finality principles, and whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
- The court ultimately reverses, holding that Thompson’s postwarning statements were rendered ineffective by a deliberate two-step interrogation under Seibert, and that their admission was reversible error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exhaustion of federal claim | Thompson fairly presented the federal claim to the California courts. | Thompson needed re-exhaustion after Seibert was decided. | Thompson exhausted; Blair retroactivity not required here. |
| Applicable AEDPA standard (Elstad vs. Seibert) for clearly established federal law | Seibert applies as clearly established law after Thompson's last state-court decision. | Elstad remained the clearly established standard at the time of the state court decision. | Court resolves under AEDPA that Elstad governs the controlling clearly established law; Seibert is not retroactively required to govern this state decision. |
| Deliberateness of the two-step interrogation | Evidence supports deliberate withholding of warnings to undermine the Miranda warning. | District court did not err in finding no deliberate two-step strategy. | On de novo review, the two-step strategy was deliberate; warnings ineffective. |
| Curative steps and effectiveness of warnings | Even with a delay, warning curative steps could salvage admissibility. | Lack of curative measures defeats effectiveness of warnings. | Insufficient curative steps; postwarning statements remain ineffective. |
| Harmlessness of the error | Confession was central and likely prejudicial; its admission affected the verdict. | Video reenactment and other evidence render any error harmless. | Admission of the confession was prejudicial and not harmless error. |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (U.S. 2004) (deliberate two-step interrogation can require suppression absent curative steps)
- Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (U.S. 1985) (subsequent warnings may validate unwarned statements if voluntary)
- Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (U.S. 2006) (clearly established law refers to holdings as of state-court decision time)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (clarifies 'clearly established law' refers to holdings as of the relevant decision)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (U.S. 2011) (limits AEDPA review to record before state court decision)
