23 F.4th 1252
10th Cir.2022Background
- Thompson, an MSU student with a light-sensitivity eye condition, sat on the classroom floor in the front row twice after arriving late; a professor ordered her to move and on the second occasion she left and later dropped the class.
- MSU refunded the tuition and removed the class from Thompson’s record; Thompson sought mediation and was encouraged to submit course evaluations.
- Because she was no longer enrolled, Thompson emailed former classmates urging them to submit “honest” end-of-term evaluations criticizing the class/professor; the complaint alleges the email caused no disruption.
- MSU Associate Director for Student Conduct Thomas Ragland sent Thompson a letter imposing a No Contact directive: she could not contact the professor or discuss the professor with any students in the professor’s classes.
- Thompson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her First Amendment rights; the district court dismissed on qualified-immunity grounds.
- The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding the complaint plausibly alleges a First Amendment violation and that existing law made Ragland’s conduct clearly unlawful at the pleading stage; the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ragland’s No Contact directive violated Thompson’s First Amendment rights | Thompson: the email was protected student speech encouraging evaluations and caused no disruption | Ragland: discipline justified by disruption from seating incidents and forum-affecting effects of encouraging negative evaluations | Held: Pleaded facts plausibly show the discipline targeted protected speech and no reasonable disruption; alleges a First Amendment violation |
| Whether the alleged violation was "clearly established" for qualified immunity | Thompson: Tinker and related precedents clearly prohibit disciplining student speech absent substantial disruption or other narrow exceptions | Ragland: law unclear, especially re: off-campus/online speech and faculty-protection interests | Held: At the motion-to-dismiss stage, law was clearly established such that dismissal on qualified immunity was improper |
| Whether the email could reasonably be expected to cause substantial disruption | Thompson: the complaint alleges no disruption and encourages standard course evaluations | Ragland: argued the email could harm professor’s career/relationships and disrupt university operations | Held: Allegations do not support a reasonable prediction of substantial disruption; speculative harms insufficient under Tinker/Seamons |
Key Cases Cited
- Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (student speech protected unless it materially disrupts school activities or invades others’ rights)
- Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (colleges not immune from First Amendment; denial of recognition is a form of prior restraint requiring a heavy justification)
- Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (discipline for disfavored content absent disruption violates First Amendment)
- Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (schools may restrict lewd or indecent student speech)
- Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (schools may regulate school-sponsored student speech for legitimate pedagogical reasons)
- Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (schools may restrict student speech reasonably regarded as promoting illegal drug use)
- Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996) (student speech cannot be punished based on undifferentiated fear of disturbance; disciplinary denial of benefits for protected speech violates First Amendment)
- Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25 (10th Cir. 2013) (Tinker supports disciplining student expression when reasonable belief of substantial disruption exists)
- Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (schools’ authority to regulate off‑campus speech is limited; lack of disruption weighs against discipline)
- Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (prior restraints carry a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality)