Thompson v. Gelb, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167760

Background

In June 2008 Thompson, then incarcerated in Maine, submitted an IAD request seeking final disposition of Massachusetts charges (armed robbery and related counts arising from a 2005 CVS robbery).
The IAD’s Article III 180‑day speedy‑trial clock began; trial had to start by December 22, 2008 absent good‑cause continuances.
Thompson was transported to Massachusetts and arraigned on October 9, 2008; the court granted continuances through November 5 and then December 11, 2008 so the Commonwealth could obtain and test Thompson’s buccal DNA swab.
Thompson’s counsel repeatedly objected to delays, but solely cited Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 (state speedy‑trial rule) and did not expressly invoke the IAD’s 180‑day limit; Thompson raised the IAD claim in a motion to dismiss 44 days after the IAD deadline had passed.
The state court denied the IAD motion, the jury convicted Thompson in March 2009, and the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed, finding the continuances reasonable and that counsel had misled the judge into focusing on Rule 36 rather than the IAD.
Thompson filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging the IAD time limit was violated; the district court dismissed the petition as not cognizable under § 2254.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an IAD Article III 180‑day violation that the state court allowed constitutes a cognizable § 2254 claim	Thompson: continuances lacked "good cause," so IAD 180‑day limit was violated and DNA used at trial was obtained after the period—prejudicing him	Commonwealth: continuances were for good cause (DNA testing in an ID case); petitioner’s counsel never asserted IAD grounds at the time, so no fundamental defect	Court: Dismissed. Claim not cognizable under § 2254 because Thompson failed to raise IAD objections when trial date was set and suffered no prejudice from the delay
Whether failure to object on IAD grounds forecloses habeas review	Thompson: he need not have orally flagged IAD because he already filed an IAD request with prosecutors	Commonwealth: litigants must flag issues in court; counsel’s affirmative misdirection to the judge prevented timely relief	Court: Agreed with Commonwealth; counsel’s deliberate focus on Rule 36 prevented the judge from addressing IAD; failure to object on IAD grounds forecloses federal habeas relief
Whether petitioner suffered prejudice from the delay (i.e., DNA evidence was outcome‑determinative)	Thompson: had trial occurred within 180 days DNA would not have been available and conviction would likely fail	Commonwealth: no evidence of unfair trial or exceptional circumstances; continuances were reasonable; no prejudice shown	Court: No prejudice shown; continuances for DNA testing were for good cause; absence of exceptional circumstances precludes habeas relief

Key Cases Cited

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (federal habeas relief available only for convictions violating U.S. Constitution, laws, or treaties)
Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994) (IAD violations are cognizable on habeas only when they produce a fundamental defect or miscarriage of justice)
New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000) (quoting IAD Article III and good‑cause continuance standard)
Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012) (identifying "exceptional circumstances" that can warrant relief despite procedural defaults)
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939) (example of exceptional circumstance justifying relief)
United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2010) (courts disfavour IAD objections raised too late when judge can no longer avoid a violation)