682 F.3d 1377
Fed. Cir.2012Background
- Thompson, a Navy veteran, had long-standing psychiatric diagnoses including paranoid schizophrenia and nervous disorders.
- In 2006 the VA RO denied service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder; Thompson appealed to the Board and then to the Veterans Court.
- The parties filed a joint motion for partial remand (JMR) citing Clemons v. Shinseki to include consideration of anxiety or schizoid disorders.
- The Veterans Court granted the JMR on September 29, 2009, directing Board reevaluation in light of Clemons.
- Thompson sought EAJA fees after the JMR; the motions were denied by a single judge (June 1, 2010) and by a panel (November 19, 2010).
- The order granting the JMR did not specify administrative error; the default rule governs unless Thompson proves the remand rested on administrative error; the court affirmed without awarding fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Thompson is a prevailing party under EAJA due to the remand | Thompson argues remand for Clemons relief was predicated on administrative error | Veterans Court remand was not based on administrative error | No, Thompson not prevailing party; remand not predicated on error |
| Whether remand for Clemons relief constitutes relief on the merits | remand effected merits-based relief | remand does not confer merits-based relief under EAJA | Remand here did not confer relief on the merits for EAJA purposes |
Key Cases Cited
- Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009) (remand framework for intervening law in veterans claims)
- Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991) (retroactive application of a new rule of federal law)
- Motorola Ceramic Prod. v. United States, 336 F.3d 1360 (2003) (remand predicated on administrative error; standard for EAJA prevailing party)
- Davis v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 1360 (2007) (remand may confer prevailing party status; burden on EAJA movant)
- Gurley v. Peake, 528 F.3d 1322 (2008) (prevailing party requires relief on the merits; remand alone not enough)
- Vaughn v. Principi, 336 F.3d 1351 (2003) (statutory review scope in EAJA context)
- Halpern v. Principi, 384 F.3d 1297 (2004) (de novo review of legal standards in EAJA determinations)
- Akers v. Nicholson, 409 F.3d 1356 (2005) (intervening law and remand considerations)
- Kelly v. Nicholson, 463 F.3d 1349 (2006) (EAJA deterrence rationale in veterans benefits)