Thompson v. Corry
231 Ariz. 161
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2012Background
- Issue is whether A.R.S. § 25-324 or Rule 92(E)(2) authorizes attorney’s fees to a party represented pro bono and whether to calculate at cost or prevailing market rate.
- Mother was represented pro bono by Community Legal Services to compel Father to comply with court orders.
- Father was found in contempt and ordered to pay Mother’s reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs; CLS represented Mother.
- Mother was awarded $3,962.50 in fees and costs; CLS claimed $250/hour but court used $175/hour.
- The question includes whether pro bono representation can support a fee award and how to calculate the fee using market rates.
- The court ultimately affirmed using prevailing market rate to calculate the fee.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority to award fees for pro bono counsel | Mother (or CLS) can be compensated under § 25-324 or Rule 92(E)(2). | Torrez restricts fee awards when representation is free; no basis for pro bono fees. | Authorized under § 25-324 and Rule 92(E)(2); pro bono representation permissible. |
| Contingent-fee concern under ER 1.5 | Awarding fees to CLS creates a contingent fee issue. | No contingent-fee arrangement; not dependent on case outcome. | Not a contingent-fee violation; permissible. |
| Proper method to calculate rate | Use Schweiger zero-rate or cost-based method. | Use prevailing market rate for similar services. | Use prevailing market rate; $175/hour adopted. |
| Applicability of market-rate method to pro bono in domestic relations | Market-rate method should apply to pro bono in domestic-relations cases. | Limitations exist; some cases permit only cost-based rates. | Market-rate methodology applies; not limited to civil rights/public cases. |
| Reasonableness of time expended | Hours billed were reasonable given hearing and preparation. | Lower hours would be sufficient; court should cap. | Court acted within discretion; 22.5 hours upheld after reduction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Keefer v. Keefer, 225 Ariz. 437, 239 P.3d 756 (App. 2010) (pro bono fees recoverable under § 25-324)
- Henriquez v. Henriquez, 971 A.2d 345 (Md. 2009) (policy support for pro bono fee awards)
- State v. Torrez, 154 Ariz. 522, 744 P.2d 434 (App. 1987) (free program; fee award lacking basis if state pays)
- Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (Supreme Court 1984) (prevailing market rate for fee awards under § 1988)
- Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593, 775 P.2d 521 (Ariz. 1989) (market-rate fees supported for pro bono representation)
- State v. Tocco, 173 Ariz. 587, 845 P.2d 513 (App. 1992) (prevailing market rate preferred for pro bono fees)
- In re Marriage of Malquist, 266 Mont. 447, 880 P.2d 1357 (Mont. 1994) (fee awards for pro bono representation)
- Serrano v. Unruh, 652 P.2d 985 (Cal. 1982) (supporting public policy of fee awards for pro bono)