916 N.W.2d 127
S.D.2018Background
- Neighbors in a small Lakota Homes community, Sarah Thompson filed for a protection order alleging Wambli Bear Runner stalked and harassed her via Facebook posts, private messages, and complaints to Sarah’s employer and police.
- Dispute began after Sarah briefly dated Wambli’s ex; parties exchanged insults in 2014 and resumed antagonistic interactions in 2016.
- Wambli made multiple public Facebook posts naming or clearly referring to Sarah, used fake Facebook accounts to send private messages urging Sarah to “disappear,” and sent employer complaints about Sarah.
- Sarah filed a police report and then a petition for a protection order for stalking under SDCL 22-19A-1 (willful, malicious, repeated harassment by electronic means).
- After a two-day hearing with testimony and exhibits, the circuit court found harassment and stalking by a preponderance of the evidence and granted the protection order.
- The Supreme Court reversed and remanded because the circuit court’s findings were conclusory and failed to identify which specific acts satisfied the statutory elements of stalking.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the protection order was supported by proper findings | Thompson argued the court’s general findings showed a preponderance that Wambli’s communications constituted stalking | Bear Runner argued the court’s findings were insufficiently specific about which acts were harassing | Reversed and remanded: findings were conclusory and merely parroted statutory language; court must identify specific conduct meeting stalking elements |
| Whether conduct constituted stalking under SDCL 22-19A-1 | Thompson contended posts, private messages, and complaints met statutory elements (willful, malicious, repeated harassment) | Bear Runner contended her speech and posts were not unlawful harassment and some were constitutionally protected | Not reached on merits — court declined to decide because inadequate findings prevented meaningful review |
| Whether the protection order was unconstitutionally vague (due process) | Thompson implicitly argued order was valid and narrowly tailored | Bear Runner argued the order was vague and violated due process by not defining prohibited conduct | Not reached — remand for specific findings made further constitutional review premature |
Key Cases Cited
- Doremus v. Morrow, 897 N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 2017) (circuit court must make findings sufficient to show how facts satisfy statutory elements)
- Repp v. Van Someren, 866 N.W.2d 122 (S.D. 2015) (meaningful appellate review requires identification of how evidence met statutory elements)
- Shroyer v. Fanning, 780 N.W.2d 467 (S.D. 2010) (standard for setting aside factual findings)
- Goeden v. Daum, 688 N.W.2d 108 (S.D. 2003) (findings must provide basis for conclusions with sufficient specificity)
- Donat v. Johnson, 862 N.W.2d 122 (S.D. 2015) (standard of review for protection order decisions)
- Erickson v. Earley, 878 N.W.2d 631 (S.D. 2016) (abuse of discretion and clear-error standards explained)
