505 F.Supp.3d 1239
M.D. Ala.2020Background
- Plaintiffs are Alabama citizens and an organization (Greater Birmingham Ministries) who challenged Alabama's felon-disenfranchisement rules: Ala. Const. art. VIII, § 177(b); the Board-of-Pardons-and-Paroles CERV statute, Ala. Code § 15‑22‑36.1(a)(3) (which conditions restoration on payment of LFOs); and the State's mail‑in voter registration language plus the 2017 codification defining "moral turpitude" (Ala. Code § 17‑3‑30.1).
- Individual plaintiffs include persons convicted of theft, burglary, murder, and drug trafficking who either owe substantial legal financial obligations or otherwise dispute whether their convictions were disqualifying.
- Plaintiffs contend claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (intentional race discrimination), the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), due process (retroactive application / vagueness), an equal‑protection wealth claim against the LFO requirement, and an NVRA claim about the State mail‑in form.
- Legal context: the 1901 Alabama Constitution used a broad "moral turpitude" disenfranchisement standard; that language was re‑enacted by amendment in 1996 (Amdt. 579). In 2017 the legislature enacted Ala. Code § 17‑3‑30.1 to enumerate and define felonies of moral turpitude.
- The case was tried to the bench; the court resolved Daubert motions and evidentiary objections and issued summary judgment rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ala. Const. §177(b) and related law were enacted with racial intent (Counts 1 & 2) | The 1901 provision was racially motivated and that taint continued into the 1996 re‑enactment; modern implementation shows disproportionate racial impact. | No admissible evidence that the 1995–96 enactment was motivated by race; later deliberative reform and voter approval removed any 1901 taint. | Court: SJ for Defendants—Plaintiffs failed to prove discriminatory intent under Hunter/Arlington Heights; Johnson/Cotton reasoning supports removal of 1901 taint. |
| Whether §177(b)/§17‑3‑30.1 imposes retroactive punishment (Ex Post Facto, Count 11; Count 17 alternative) | The 2017 codification retroactively imposed punitive disenfranchisement because prior standard was vague; persons convicted earlier lacked fair notice. | Prior constitutional language and Alabama case law already provided notice that many felonies were disenfranchising; statute merely clarified. | Court: SJ for Defendants—no ex post facto violation as named plaintiffs had sufficient notice; §17‑3‑30.1 was not an unforeseeable increase in punishment as to them. |
| Whether permanent disenfranchisement violates Eighth Amendment (Count 12) | Lifetime disenfranchisement for listed offenses is cruel and unusual; national trend opposes lifetime bans. | Disenfranchisement is constitutionally permitted (Richardson); Eighth Amendment claim inconsistent with established precedent. | Court: SJ for Defendants—Eighth Amendment claim fails; longstanding authority permits felon disenfranchisement. |
| Whether Ala. Code §15‑22‑36.1's LFO payment requirement violates equal protection by discriminating on wealth (Count 13) | Conditioning CERV on payment of fines/fees is wealth‑based discrimination; some crimes unrelated to voting are treated worse. | Wealth is not a suspect class; rational‑basis review governs and payment is rationally related to rehabilitation/complete sentence. | Court: SJ for Defendants—rational‑basis applies (Jones II) and statute survives as rationally related to legitimate state interests. |
| Whether retrospective application of §17‑3‑30.1 to pre‑2017 convictions violated Due Process (Count 16) | The statute is written in present tense and Alabama presumes statutes not retroactive; application to prior convictions deprived liberty without lawful authority. | Plaintiffs lack precedent to extend Duncan; named plaintiffs had notice or administrative remedies exist. | Court: SJ for Defendants—no federal due process violation shown; Duncan is distinguishable and Plaintiffs fail to show a cognizable federal deprivation. |
| Whether Alabama's mail‑in voter registration form violates the NVRA by not listing each disqualifying felony (Count 18) | NVRA requires the mail form to "specify" each eligibility requirement and that mandates listing all disqualifying felonies (or an explicit catchall). | "Specify" does not require enumerating every disqualifying felony; referencing the Secretary of State website and the catchall is sufficient; EAC practice supports that reading. | Court: SJ for Defendants—NVRA satisfied; government form need not list every disqualifying felony and EAC's interpretation supports the State's practice. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (holding the 1901 Alabama misdemeanor disenfranchisement provision was motivated by racial discrimination)
- Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.) (analyzing whether later deliberative re‑enactment removed earlier discriminatory taint)
- Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (upholding state felon disenfranchisement under the Fourteenth Amendment)
- Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (framework of factors for proving discriminatory legislative intent)
- Jones v. Governor of Florida (en banc), 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir.) (governing standard for wealth/equal‑protection challenges to felon re‑enfranchisement and applying rational‑basis review)
- Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir.) (examined whether subsequent legislative amendments removed discriminatory intent)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (setting out the intent‑effects test for whether a civil statute is punitive for Ex Post Facto purposes)
- Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (discussing when a statutory disability constitutes punishment)
- Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (Ex Post Facto Clause protects against laws increasing punishment after the fact)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (trial judge's gatekeeping role for expert testimony)