Thomas West v. Charles Ryan, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26165

Background

West was convicted in Arizona in 1988 of first-degree felony murder, second-degree burglary, and theft, and sentenced to death after a sentencing phase with specific aggravating factors.
On direct and post-conviction review, his federal habeas petitions were denied; the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1994, 2011, and related proceedings occurred through 2011.
West sought authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) to file a second or successive federal habeas petition in the Ninth Circuit after execution planning began in 2011.
He proposed two claims: (i) ineffective assistance at sentencing for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence affecting aggravators; (ii) PTSD diagnoses rendering him ineligible for the death penalty by negating aggravators.
The district court and Ninth Circuit denied authorization, concluding the claims were either procedurally barred as successive or failed under AEDPA’s stringent standard for second petitions.
The court held that the first claim was precluded as raised in a prior petition, and that under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) West failed to show newly discovered evidence or actual innocence sufficient to overcome the successive-petition bar.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was West's ineffective-assistance claim previously raised?	West argues claim A8 was not raised before.	West's prior claim addressed similar mitigation deficiencies; it's the same claim renewed.	Claim barred; previously raised and dismissed.
Does AEDPA require new standards to authorize second petitions?	New evidence could meet § 2244(b)(2)(B) due to PTSD and abuse history.	AEDPA's stringent standard applies; new evidence not shown to be newly discovered or to preclude guilt beyond reasonable doubt.	Standards not satisfied; petition not authorized.
Is the evidence about childhood abuse or PTSD newly discovered?	Family abuse and PTSD were not previously disclosed and could be newly discovered.	Abuse information was knowable earlier; PTSD diagnosis existed only after trial, not newly discovered.	Evidence not newly discovered; not sufficient under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i).
Would the new evidence, if true, establish actual innocence or negate aggravators so as to foreclose death penalty under the actual-innocence standard?	PTSD and abuse could negate aggravators and render death penalty unconstitutional.	Bad acts and aggravators remain despite PTSD; no clear and convincing proof to override death sentence.	No, not shown by clear and convincing evidence.
Would PTSD evidence change the three aggravating factors enough to alter the death sentence?	PTSD undermines all three aggravating factors.	PTSD does not negate all aggravators; remains consistent with a death sentence.	PTSD would not change the outcome; no relief.

Key Cases Cited

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (U.S. 2005) (determines when claims are 'presented' in a second or successive petition)
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (U.S. 1998) (actual innocence standard in AEDPA context)
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (U.S. 1992) (actual innocence and mitigating evidence considerations in capital sentencing)
Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (U.S. 2001) (convictions finality and exceptions for actual innocence)
West v. Ryan, 608 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2010) (prior diligence and mitigation development in habeas context)
State v. Jensen, 735 P.2d 781 (Ariz. 1987) ( PTSD recognition and timing for diagnostic testing)
Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1996) (pecuniary gain aggravator standards)
Prasertphong, 76 P.3d 438 (Ariz. 2003) (Arizona standard for pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance)