284 F. Supp. 3d 66
D.D.C.2018Background
- Thomas was a Salisbury, MA police officer whose job security became the subject of internal investigations.
- L'Esperance, appointed Chief in 2006 with Harrington as Town Manager, conducted investigations that culminated in Thomas facing scrutiny.
- St. Pierre was contracted by Harrington to investigate allegations against L'Esperance and later against Thomas; Harrington made the ultimate termination decision for Thomas.
- Thomas submitted a whistle-blower letter alleging Sullivan's sexual harassment in February 2011, after which Thomas learned his own investigation would proceed.
- Salisbury conducted a formal disciplinary process against Thomas resulting in his termination in 2012, later reversed by arbitration reinstating him with back pay, though the arbitration ruling was not binding on the court.
- Thomas alleged state and federal constitutional and state-law claims arising from the investigations, termination, and alleged post-employment activities by Harrington.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Civil conspiracy against Harrington and St. Pierre | Thomas alleges concerted action causing his injury. | No tortious plan or substantial assistance; Harrington made final decisions. | Summary judgment for defendants on Count V. |
| Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim against Harrington | Hurrrington coerced Thomas into resigning via pressure and sham process. | No threats, intimidation, or coercion; due process followed. | Summary judgment for defendants on Count VII. |
| Intentional infliction of emotional distress | Sham investigation, publication of report, and other actions caused severe distress. | Actions were not extreme and outrageous; due process protections and facts do not support IIED. | Summary judgment for defendants on Count VIII. |
| Interference with contract and advantageous relations | Harrington's actions interfered with Thomas's employment contract and related relations. | Interference was not malicious or improper; actions within official duties. | Summary judgment for defendants on Counts IX–X. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kyte v. Philip Morris Inc., 408 Mass. 162 (Mass. 1990) (concerted-action/intentional conduct in civil conspiracy analysis)
- Stock v. Fife, 430 N.E.2d 845 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (shared liability for a common tortious plan)
- Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 631 N.E.2d 989 (Mass. 1994) (definition of threats/intimidation/coercion in MCRA context)
- Ali v. Univ. of Mass. Med. Ctr., 140 F.Supp.2d 107 (D. Mass. 2001) (MCRA requirements; coercion standard in context of institutional action)
- Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82 (Mass. 1987) (outrageousness standard for IIED)
- Cachopa v. Town of Stoughton, 72 Mass.App.Ct. 657 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (elements of intentional interference with contract/advantageous relations)
- Blackstone v. Cashman, 448 Mass. 255 (Mass. 2007) (actual malice required for official-interference claims)
- Nolan v. CN8, 656 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2011) (non-physical coercion; First Circuit interpretation of coercion in civil rights context)