Thomas v. Salvation Army Southern Territory, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20149

Sharon Thomas, a homeless woman receiving behavioral health services, was admitted to a Salvation Army shelter on July 12, 2012, then transferred to Church in the City; she was evicted from Church in the City on August 12 and thereafter repeatedly denied readmission to the Salvation Army shelter.
Thomas disclosed mental health treatment to shelter staff, visited the Salvation Army for medication and case management, and later obtained a brief psychiatric emergency-room evaluation after being barred.
Salvation Army communications said Thomas was denied because she had exhibited "disrespect and hostility" toward staff and offered conditional readmission if she completed a mental-health evaluation and stabilization services; Thomas requested records and sued two years later.
Thomas sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, the ADA (Titles II/III), the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and the Rehabilitation Act; the district court dismissed all claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and Thomas appealed.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo, construed the pro se complaint liberally, but found deficiencies in pleading state action, conspiracy, disability and causation, and lack of standing for injunctive ADA relief; the dismissal was affirmed but modified to be without prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
§ 1983: Were defendants state actors?	Thomas contends defendants acted under color of state law in denying shelter.	Defendants are private charities; no facts showing state action.	No state action; § 1983 claim fails.
§ 1985: Was there a conspiratorial class-based deprivation?	Thomas alleges Salvation Army conspired with Church in the City to exclude her.	Allegations are parallel conduct and conclusory, no facts of agreement.	Conspiracy claim implausible; § 1985 dismissed.
ADA Title III/II: Is Thomas entitled to injunctive relief for public-accommodation discrimination?	Thomas claims disability-based exclusion from shelters entitles her to relief.	No ongoing or imminent threat; Title II applies only to public entities; Title III provides only injunctive relief and requires imminent injury.	No standing for injunctive relief; Title II inapplicable; ADA claim dismissed.
FHA / Rehabilitation Act: Did defendants deny housing because of a handicap?	Thomas alleges denial due to mental disability.	Complaint fails to plead a qualifying disability or that denial was "because of" disability; Rehabilitation Act requires federal funding and causation "solely by reason of."	Claims implausible for failure to plead disability and causation; both statutes' claims dismissed.

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) (§ 1983 requires state action)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must permit reasonable inference of liability)
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (injunctive relief requires real and immediate threat)
De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003) (§ 1915(e) dismissal standard equals Rule 12(b)(6))
Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370 (4th Cir. 1995) (elements required for a § 1985 conspiracy claim)
McInerney v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 505 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007) (Title III of the ADA does not require administrative exhaustion)
Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2012) (Rehabilitation Act requires exclusion "solely by reason of" disability)