Thomas v. Panco Management of Maryland, LLC
31 A.3d 583
| Md. | 2011Background
- Mary Thomas sued Foxfire Associates and Panco Management for a slip-and-fall on black ice at Foxfire Apartments in Laurel, Maryland.
- The trial court granted judgment for the respondents on the defense of assumption of the risk, ending Petitioner's case.
- Evidence showed icy conditions on the common areas, a front stair/sidewalk configuration, and a rear exit allegedly leading to an unsafe path.
- Petitioner argued she did not have full knowledge or appreciation of the risk and did not voluntarily confront it.
- Court of Special Appeals affirmed; this Court granted certiorari to decide whether assumption of the risk could be decided as a matter of law.
- The Court held the judge erred in granting judgment as to knowledge and voluntariness; these are jury questions on remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Knowledge of risk as a matter of law | Thomas argues Allen misapplied law; knowledge not imputable. | Respondents rely on Allen to impute knowledge of black ice as law. | Knowledge not imputed; jury question on knowledge. |
| Voluntariness under Rountree in landlord-tenant context | Thomas contends Rountree remains good law; voluntariness for jury. | Respondents contend Rountree is outdated and voluntariness can be determined by law. | Rountree remains good law; voluntariness for jury. |
| Existence of a reasonably safe alternative exit | Thomas had a reasonably safe alternative route; choices negate assumption. | There was at most one safe route; assumption may apply. | Jury must determine existence of alternatives and voluntariness. |
| Relation between knowledge, voluntariness, and contributory negligence | Knowledge and voluntariness require jury; overlap with contributory negligence unresolved. | Defense may be supported by law if elements satisfied. | Overlap to be resolved by jury; not decided as a matter of law. |
Key Cases Cited
- Allen v. Marriott Worldwide Corp., 183 Md.App. 460, 961 A.2d 1141 (2008) (disapproved for expanding knowledge prong to impute knowledge as law)
- Poole v. Coakley & Williams Constr., Inc., 423 Md. 91, 31 A.3d 212 (2011) (limits imputing knowledge; emphasizes jury resolution when facts are disputed)
- ADM P'ship v. Martin, 348 Md. 84, 702 A.2d 730 (1997) (three elements of assumption of risk; voluntariness; duress concepts)
- Rountree v. Lerner Dev. Co., 52 Md.App. 281, 447 A.2d 902 (1982) (duress/voluntariness; landlord-tenant egress duties; reasonable alternatives)
- Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 592 A.2d 1119 (1991) (imputing knowledge only when clear and undisputed; jury otherwise)
- Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 226 A.2d 273 (1967) (voluntariness where danger is obvious; rights of entry and exit)
- Morgan State Univ. v. Walker, 397 Md. 509, 919 A.2d 21 (2007) (distinguishes Rountree; voluntary alternatives and safety considerations)
- Lamy (Odenton Dev. v. Lamy), 320 Md. 33, 575 A.2d 1235 (1990) (safe alternative routes; voluntary choice analysis)
- Langley Park Apartments, Sec. H., Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402, 199 A.2d 620 (1964) (tenant ingress/egress duty to maintain safe means of passage)