Thomas v. Meadors, 2017 Ark. App. 421

Alfred Thomas, Sr. underwent elective revascularization on Aug. 29, 2011; immediately after induction of general anesthesia he experienced an acute hypotensive decompensation, was treated with a Swan-Ganz catheter and vasopressors, and the surgeons proceeded with the operation; he died three days later from cardiogenic shock.
Carolyn Thomas, administratrix, sued anesthesiologist Dr. Carol Meadors and Little Rock Anesthesia Services for medical negligence, alleging inadequate preoperative evaluation and failure to halt the procedure after the post-induction collapse.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing plaintiff lacked expert proof that Meadors’s alleged breaches proximately caused Thomas’s death (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-206(a)(3)).
Plaintiff’s main expert testimony: Drs. Beacham and Rinder opined the procedure should have been stopped and that stopping would have increased the decedent’s chance of "awakening;" Beacham later supplied an affidavit claiming stopping would have made awakening highly likely and linked failure to stop to the cardiogenic shock.
Defense experts and some plaintiff experts testified they could not say to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that stopping would have prevented death or altered the ultimate outcome.
The circuit court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding plaintiff failed to meet proof with proof on proximate causation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiff produced expert proof that defendant's alleged breaches proximately caused death	Beacham/Rinder: stopping after induction would have increased chance of awakening and contributed to preventing cardiogenic shock	Experts cannot state to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that, but for the alleged breaches, Thomas would have survived	Held for defendant: plaintiff failed to produce expert causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty; summary judgment affirmed
Whether plaintiff may rely on a "loss-of-chance" or increased‑survivability theory instead of but‑for causation	Plaintiff argues reduced "survivability"/awakening is sufficient to create a material fact issue	Defendants argue Arkansas has not adopted lost‑chance as a substitute for traditional but‑for proximate cause	Held for defendant: court requires but‑for proximate-cause proof; plaintiff’s loss‑of‑chance framing did not defeat summary judgment

Neal v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 422 S.W.3d 116 (Ark. 2012) (causation principles in medical malpractice and limits on contributory testimony)
Holt v. Wagner, 43 S.W.3d 128 (Ark. 2001) (discussing but declining to adopt lost‑chance doctrine at that time)
Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kilgore, 148 S.W.3d 754 (Ark. App.) (expert-opinion standards and proximate causation requirements)
Sanders v. Banks, 830 S.W.2d 861 (Ark.) (when a party cannot prove an essential element, movant is entitled to summary judgment)