462 F.Supp.3d 828
N.D. Ohio2020Background
- Plaintiffs are Ohio Amazon fulfillment center warehouse workers who allege they were required to clock out and pass through mandatory security screening after shifts and before lunch; screening involves waiting, metal detectors, and bag inspection and routinely takes 10–20 minutes.
- Plaintiffs filed a putative class action under the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (O.R.C. § 4111.03), alleging unpaid time for security screenings resulted in underpaid overtime.
- Defendants answered that (a) Ohio law incorporates the FLSA as amended (including the Portal-to-Portal Act), (b) employees need not go through screening for on-site lunches because break rooms exist inside the secure area, and (c) walking through screening is not compensable work because it requires no exertion.
- Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), arguing post-shift screening is noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act (and related defenses as to pre-lunch screens and lack of exertion).
- The court (Barker, J.) granted the motion in part and denied it in part: claims based on post-shift screenings were dismissed as noncompensable postliminary activities under the Portal-to-Portal Act as incorporated into Ohio law; claims based on pre-lunch screenings survived because the Portal-to-Portal Act does not govern compensability of work performed during the workday and factual disputes (including whether pre-lunch screening was mandatory) remained.
- The court also rejected dismissal on the ground that walking through screening is not "work," noting Sixth Circuit precedent that (1) exertion is not a dispositive requirement and (2) undergoing screening can involve exertion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether O.R.C. § 4111.03 incorporates the Portal-to-Portal Act so post-shift screening is noncompensable | O.R.C. § 4111.03 does not incorporate the Portal-to-Portal Act | O.R.C. § 4111.03 incorporates Section 7 "as amended," which includes the Portal-to-Portal Act; Busk I controls | Court: OMFWSA incorporates Portal-to-Portal; post-shift screening claims dismissed |
| Whether Portal-to-Portal bars claims for pre-lunch screening that shortens meal breaks | Portal-to-Portal does not apply to workday (pre-meal) activities; claim survives | (Arguably) pre-lunch screening also noncompensable | Court: Portal-to-Portal inapplicable to pre-lunch (workday) screenings; claim survives |
| Whether pre-lunch screening is mandatory (i.e., employees can take lunch inside secure area) | Plaintiffs allege screenings are mandatory; factual dispute exists | Defendants allege onsite break rooms inside secure area so screening optional; complaint didn’t rebut answer | Court: Treats answer allegations as denied and accepts plaintiffs’ allegations at this stage; factual dispute precludes dismissal |
| Whether walking through security is "work" requiring exertion | Walking/ screening involves exertion or exertion not required for "work" | No exertion, so not compensable work | Court: Defendants’ exertion argument fails; cannot dismiss (Sixth Circuit precedent rejects exertion requirement and finds screening can be work) |
Key Cases Cited
- Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014) (Supreme Court holds post-shift security screenings are noncompensable postliminary activities under the Portal-to-Portal Act)
- Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., 905 F.3d 387 (6th Cir. 2018) (Sixth Circuit treats Portal-to-Portal incorporation issues and holds Portal-to-Portal may not bar pre-meal screening claims; finds screening can be work)
- IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (characterizes the Portal-to-Portal Act as an amendment to the FLSA)
- Vance v. Amazon.com, Inc., 852 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2017) (discusses state incorporation of Portal-to-Portal and related wage-hour analysis)
- Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944) (historic definition of "work" as physical or mental exertion)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard for plausibility)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard clarifications)
- JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2007) (Rule 12(c) standard)