Thomas S. Tufts v. Edward C. Hay, Jr., 977 F.3d 1204

Tufts (Florida lawyer and firm) and Hay (North Carolina lawyer and firm) both represented Biltmore in related matters; Hay told Tufts a bankruptcy-court “bench order” authorized Tufts as special counsel, but no bench order existed.
Relying on Hay’s representations, Tufts performed work (transferred litigation, disbursed settlement funds, appealed a comfort order); the Bankruptcy Court later ordered disgorgement of fees and held Tufts in civil contempt.
Biltmore’s Chapter 11 case was later dismissed by consent; Tufts sued Hay in district court for negligent and intentional misrepresentation and indemnification.
District Court first denied Hay’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, then granted Hay’s second motion to dismiss under the Barton doctrine for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (failure to obtain leave from the Bankruptcy Court).
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal: it held Barton did not apply because the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction after the Chapter 11 dismissal (parties conceded no conceivable effect on the estate) and remanded.
The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the District Court’s denial of Hay’s personal-jurisdiction motion, finding Florida’s long-arm statute and due-process requirements satisfied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Barton doctrine bars Tufts’ district-court suit (i.e., required leave from the Bankruptcy Court)	Barton does not apply because the Chapter 11 case was dismissed and the Bankruptcy Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate related claims	Barton requires leave before suing court-appointed or court-approved officers for acts in their official capacity; failure to obtain leave deprives district court of subject-matter jurisdiction	Reversed dismissal: Barton does not apply where the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction (parties agreed the suit could have no conceivable effect on the estate)
Whether the District Court had personal jurisdiction over Hay (Florida)	Tufts: Hay made repeated misrepresentations into Florida to a Florida-resident attorney, causing harm in Florida; Florida's long-arm and due-process tests are satisfied	Hay: insufficient minimum contacts; challenge to the District Court's purposeful-availment analysis	Affirmed: Florida’s long-arm statute covers torts committed into Florida; Hay purposefully availed (communications into Florida), but-for causation satisfied, and exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable

Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (recognizing leave-of-court requirement before suing receivers or court-appointed officers)
Carter v. Rodgers, 220 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir.) (Barton doctrine requires leave before suing bankruptcy-court-appointed officers)
Lawrence v. Goldberg, 573 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir.) (applied Barton to court-approved counsel functioning as court-appointed officers)
In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 910 F.2d 784 (11th Cir.) ("conceivable effect" test for related-to bankruptcy jurisdiction under § 1334)
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir.) (tests for specific personal jurisdiction in intentional-tort cases)
Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2010) (Florida long-arm: tortious acts into Florida via communications can establish jurisdiction)