Thomas Preston v. Fidelity Brokerage Services
20-1612
| 3rd Cir. | Mar 30, 2022Background
- Preston was hired by Fidelity as a Financial Consultant and was subject to a Temporary Lockout (TLO) policy requiring a value‑add, investment‑related conversation and a Siebel entry to claim customer attribution and compensation.
- An anonymous complaint prompted an internal Fidelity investigation that flagged several of Preston’s TLOs, including a Siebel entry describing a substantive call with “Customer A” despite a six‑second outbound call and no incoming call recorded in phone logs.
- Investigators reported that Preston admitted falsifying books and records; Preston denies making that admission. Fidelity concluded he falsified records to obtain compensation, terminated him, and filed a Form U5 stating he had recorded a detailed customer interaction without having had the requisite interaction.
- Preston sued for age discrimination and defamation; after discovery and exclusion of his expert, both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted Fidelity’s motion as to defamation.
- The Third Circuit affirmed, adopting the District Court’s reasoning: it applied the more plaintiff‑friendly conditional privilege standard (defeatable by negligence), found Fidelity conducted a reasonable investigation and accurately reported its conclusion on the Form U5, and held Preston failed to raise a genuine issue of negligence or material fact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether statements on the FINRA Form U5 enjoy absolute or conditional privilege | Preston: Pennsylvania law does not clearly afford absolute privilege for Form U5 statements; conditional privilege should apply | Fidelity: Form U5 is integral to FINRA regulation and should receive absolute privilege; if conditional, only malice (not negligence) should defeat it | Court did not decide absolute vs. conditional; assumed conditional (plaintiff‑friendly) and proceeded to analysis |
| Whether Preston can defeat conditional privilege by showing negligence (or malice) in preparing the Form U5 | Preston: Fidelity was negligent in preparing/submitting the Form U5 and thus lost conditional privilege protection | Fidelity: Its investigation and review were reasonable and careful; no negligence (and no malice) | Held for Fidelity: under the negligence standard, no genuine issue of negligence; summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether the Form U5 statements were false/defamatory | Preston: Statements asserted falsification and were defamatory | Fidelity: Statements accurately reflected its investigation and conclusion that Preston misreported customer interactions | Court found undisputed record support for Fidelity’s description; not defeated as false |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate | Preston: Material facts remain in dispute (e.g., alleged incoming call, investigators’ statements) | Fidelity: Evidence shows reasonable investigation and undisputed facts supporting its conclusion and Form U5 statements | Court: No genuine issue of material fact; summary judgment for Fidelity affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2016) (standards for de novo appellate review of summary judgment)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (trial judge’s role on summary judgment and standard for genuine issue of material fact)
- Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010) (summary judgment standard and view of evidence for nonmovant)
- Agriss v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 334 Pa. Super. 295 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (absolute privilege doctrine for defamatory publications)
- Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595 (Pa. 1963) (discussion of absolute immunity for certain communications)
- U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1990) (burden on defendant to prove privilege exists)
- Miketic v. Baron, 675 A.2d 324 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (elements and scope of conditional privilege in Pennsylvania)
- R. v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142 (Pa. 1994) (Pennsylvania recognition of reputation as a protected interest)
