Thomas Porter v. Harold Clarke
923 F.3d 348
| 4th Cir. | 2019Background
- Plaintiffs (Porter, Juniper, Lawlor) challenged pre-2015 Sussex I death-row conditions: individual 71 sq ft cells, solid steel doors, 23–24 hours/day in-cell confinement, limited out-of-cell time (one hour outdoor 5 days/week in single cages; 10-min showers 3×/week), and severely restricted congregate programming or visits.
- Pre-2015 rules permitted only noncontact visits except rare contact visits, limited staff and mental-health contacts, and very limited congregate activity; Plaintiffs spent years under those conditions.
- Plaintiffs sued under the Eighth Amendment; the district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, finding the conditions created a substantial risk of serious psychological/emotional harm and that officials were deliberately indifferent; it awarded injunctive and declaratory relief.
- After suit was filed, VDOC (Virginia Dept. of Corrections) revised procedures (2015) to add weekly contact visits, daily in-pod recreation with small groups, increased outdoor recreation and daily showers; Plaintiffs concede these current conditions are constitutional.
- The State appealed, arguing (1) the Eighth Amendment claim failed, (2) injunctive relief was improper because the challenged conditions no longer existed and were unlikely to recur, and (3) the PLRA bars prospective relief absent an ongoing violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether pre-2015 death-row conditions satisfied the objective Eighth Amendment standard (substantial risk of serious harm) | Conditions amount to prolonged solitary-like confinement that empirical literature shows causes serious psychological/emotional harm | Prior Fourth Circuit authority and factual differences mean conditions were not an objectively serious risk; plaintiffs’ evidence is generalized | Held for Plaintiffs: undisputed record and expert literature establish a substantial risk of serious psychological/emotional harm |
| Whether officials acted with the requisite subjective state (deliberate indifference) | Officials knew or should have known risks (prior court rulings, policies limiting segregation elsewhere, warden testimony, published literature) and failed to act | Officials had legitimate penological justifications; courts must consider penological objectives | Held for Plaintiffs: undisputed facts and circumstantial evidence (awareness + inaction) establish deliberate indifference; State’s penological defense was not pursued on appeal (waived) |
| Whether prospective injunctive relief was appropriate given VDOC changed policies after suit | Injunction remains warranted because there is a cognizable danger of recurrence: changes were influenced by litigation, no legal barrier prevents reversion, and officials declined to promise non-reversion | Relief improper because the challenged practices were discontinued, VDOC invested in reforms and swore it does not intend to revert; injunction unnecessary and advisory | Held for Plaintiffs: district court did not abuse discretion; factual findings (influence of litigation, lack of binding nonreversion promise, absence of legal barrier) support cognizable danger of recurrence |
| Whether the PLRA bars initial prospective relief absent an ongoing constitutional violation | PLRA does not restrict a court’s initial equitable authority; §3626(a)(1) requires relief to be narrowly drawn and necessary but does not add an "ongoing violation" prerequisite | PLRA requires a current and ongoing violation to support prospective relief (so relief is barred where violation has ceased) | Held for Plaintiffs: §3626(a)(1) does not include the "current and ongoing" language and therefore does not categorically bar initial prospective relief when defendants have ceased practices; statutory text and structure support this reading |
Key Cases Cited
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate indifference standard for Eighth Amendment conditions claims)
- Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (objective standard for conditions of confinement review)
- Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (characterizing certain administrative-control units as highly restrictive solitary confinement)
- W.T. Grant Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 629 (1953) (injunctions require a cognizable danger of recurrent violation; relief must be needed)
- Mickle v. Moore, 174 F.3d 464 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding lengthy segregation in earlier Fourth Circuit precedent)
- Sweet v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975) (earlier en banc discussion of segregation and isolation limits)
- Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015) (recognizing prolonged solitary confinement's psychological toll)