Thomas Porter v. Harold Clarke
852 F.3d 358
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- Three Virginia death-row inmates (Porter, Juniper, Lawlor) sued, alleging pre-2015 conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment (extreme isolation, tiny cells, no group programming, limited visitation and recreation).
- While litigation was pending, the Virginia DOC adopted interim (Aug. 2015) and then final (June 2016) policies (Operating Procedure 425.A) expanding contact visitation, indoor/outdoor group recreation, showers, and programming; DOC also built new dayroom and yard.
- Defendants never agreed to an unconditional, irrevocable commitment to keep the revised policies in place and expressly retained authority to change or reinstate prior restrictions for security reasons.
- The district court held the policy changes mooted plaintiffs’ claims and granted summary judgment for defendants; plaintiffs appealed.
- The Fourth Circuit considered whether voluntary policy changes by a government defendant mooted an ongoing Eighth Amendment challenge under the voluntary-cessation exception to mootness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DOC’s voluntary policy changes mooted the Eighth Amendment challenge | The case is not moot because DOC has not provided an unconditional, irrevocable promise not to revert; plaintiffs seek a declaration and an injunction preserving the improvements | Policy changes address the challenged conditions; dismissal appropriate because the contested practices have been remedied | Reversed: voluntary cessation did not moot the case because DOC failed to show it is "absolutely clear" wrongful behavior cannot recur |
| Whether DOC’s retained authority to revisit or reinstate prior restrictions defeats mootness | Retained authority and capacity to revert means risk of recurrence remains; plaintiffs need protection | DOC’s security-based discretion is legitimate and prevents an absolute promise; changes reflect penological needs | Held for plaintiffs on mootness: retention of authority to reinstate supports non-mootness |
| Whether absence of an explicit promise not to resume prior practices requires denial of mootness | Plaintiffs: refusal to promise is dispositive; courts require clear, irrevocable abandonment | Defendants: cannot irrevocably bind future security judgments; reluctant willingness to keep changes is enough | Court agreed with plaintiffs: refusal to unambiguously terminate prior practice means heavy Laidlaw burden unmet |
| Whether other procedural or prudential defects (e.g., Rule 56(f) notice, effective remedy/prudential mootness) barred relief | Plaintiffs noted district court may have decided mootness sua sponte without proper notice | Defendants argued additional doctrines (lack of effective remedy/prudential mootness) justify dismissal | Court declined to decide those subsidiary issues on appeal and remanded for further proceedings on the merits as appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (defendant bears heavy burden to show voluntary cessation moots case)
- City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982) (voluntary cessation exception prevents defendants from evading review)
- W.T. Grant Co. v. City of New York, 345 U.S. 629 (1953) (mere possibility of recurrence defeats mootness)
- Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (2013) (an unconditional, irrevocable change can moot a case)
- Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 2014) (government’s retained authority to reinstate a policy can defeat mootness)
- Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2007) (transfer to a location where policy cannot reach may moot a challenge)
- Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 776 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1985) (replacement that irrevocably eradicates challenged effects can moot suit)
- Telco Commc’ns, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1989) (governmental entity that does not assert future enforcement can render challenge moot)