Thomas M. Dennis v. Shelia F. Dennis
234 So. 3d 371
| Miss. | 2017Background
- Thomas Dennis married Sheila Sims in 1994; Sims’s granddaughter Courtney (Sims’s daughter’s child) had a child, J.R.H., making Sims J.R.H.’s great-grandmother and Dennis the step-great-grandfather.
- In 2005 DHS alerted Sims about the parents’ troubles; the Hartzells (natural parents) and Dennis/Sims executed a joint custody petition placing J.R.H. with Dennis and Sims; the Hartzells agreed to pay monthly support.
- In the divorce settlement incorporated into the 2009 decree, Dennis agreed to pay $400/month child support for J.R.H. and received visitation rights; the Agreement stated support would continue until specified termination events or a court order.
- After the divorce the child ceased contact with Dennis (Sims testified Dennis made a statement about the child’s deceased grandmother; Dennis denied it). Sims will not force visits.
- Dennis sought to terminate ongoing child-support obligations, arguing he never stood in loco parentis and that the breakdown of the relationship (and the natural parents’ continuing obligations) should end his duty; the chancery court denied relief and found no material change.
- The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, holding Dennis voluntarily and knowingly bound himself by the settlement incorporated into the divorce decree and that the child’s refusal to visit did not constitute the ‘clear and extreme’ conduct required to terminate support.
Issues
| Issue | Dennis’s Argument | Sims’s / State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dennis had a legal duty to pay child support for a non-biological, step-great-grandchild | No statutory duty—he is not a parent or in loco parentis; thus he may terminate obligations | Dennis voluntarily agreed in the divorce settlement to pay; settlement is enforceable as part of decree | Held: Agreement is quasi-contractual and enforceable; Dennis knowingly and voluntarily assumed obligation, so duty remains |
| Whether the collapse of the relationship (child’s refusal to visit) justifies terminating support | Child’s refusal (two years) and breakdown of relationship justify termination | Child’s refusal by a young minor is not the “clear and extreme” conduct needed to end support; prior alleged statements by Dennis undermine his claim | Held: Child’s refusal does not meet Caldwell standard for forfeiture of support given child’s age and circumstances |
| Whether ongoing parental obligations of natural parents or Dennis’s temporary custody status bar enforcement or reduction | Hartzells still obligated to pay; requiring Dennis to pay is double recovery; he should be allowed to terminate or reduce payments | Settlement created Dennis’s separate obligation; natural parents’ obligations do not relieve him or require reduction absent modification showing material change | Held: Hartzells’ obligations do not negate Dennis’s contractual duty; no modification granted absent after-arising change |
Key Cases Cited
- Logan v. Logan, 730 So.2d 1124 (Miss. 1998) (defines in loco parentis standard)
- Williams v. Williams, 843 So.2d 720 (Miss. 2003) (third parties not compelled to support absent adoption or voluntary assumption; public-policy rationale)
- West v. West, 891 So.2d 203 (Miss. 2004) (settlement agreements incorporated into irreconcilable-divorce decrees are enforceable like contracts)
- Lee v. Lee, 12 So.3d 548 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (husband who knowingly agreed to support a non-biological child bound by settlement)
- Caldwell v. Caldwell, 579 So.2d 543 (Miss. 1991) (minor’s conduct can, in rare cases, forfeit support when conduct is clear and extreme)
- Roberts v. Brown, 805 So.2d 649 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (example of ‘clear and extreme’ conduct justifying termination of support)
- Shipley v. Ferguson, 638 So.2d 1295 (Miss. 1994) (settlement-modification requires after-arising material change)
- Bell v. Bell, 572 So.2d 841 (Miss. 1990) (parties’ agreements should be enforced absent fraud or overreaching)
- Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Marshall, 859 So.2d 387 (Miss. 2003) (standard of appellate review for chancery court findings)
