102 A.3d 736
D.C.2014Background
- Officer stopped Thomas Butler for broken brake lights; Butler was sole occupant of the vehicle.
- Officer smelled a strong, "fresh" marijuana odor coming from the car while speaking to Butler at the passenger window.
- Butler denied the smell, invited the officer to search the car, and made remarks inviting inspection of his fingers.
- Officer asked Butler to step out, brought him to the rear of the vehicle, and began a search of Butler’s person.
- Officer found a bag of amphetamine wedged between Butler’s sock and shoe and a bag of marijuana beneath it; Butler was then handcuffed and later arrested.
- Trial court denied Butler’s motion to suppress; D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed, holding officer had probable cause to arrest/search based on (1) sole occupancy and (2) scent of fresh marijuana linking the contraband to Butler.
Issues
| Issue | Butler's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether smelling marijuana from a car alone provides probable cause to arrest and search a person | Smell alone does not particularize probable cause to arrest Butler’s person; search was an evidentiary, non-consensual search | Odor of marijuana can itself provide probable cause to arrest, permitting a search incident to arrest | Court rejected the broad government position but held probable cause existed here because Butler was sole occupant and the odor was of fresh marijuana, so arrest/search were lawful |
| Whether a search conducted before formal arrest can be justified as incident to arrest | Search prior to a formal arrest was investigatory and not justified absent an actual arrest | A search-incident-to-arrest may precede formal arrest if probable cause to arrest exists and arrest follows quickly | Majority: search permissible because probable cause existed at time of search and arrest followed; Dissent: Supreme Court requires the fact of an arrest (Knowles/Robinson) so this search was not incident to arrest |
| Whether consent was a basis for the search | Butler denied consenting to a vehicle search at trial (disputed) | Government initially asserted consent to search the car (not relied on at trial or appeal) | Trial court briefly relied on consent theory, but government did not press consent on appeal; court’s affirmance rests on probable cause, not consent |
| Distinction between probable cause to search a vehicle and probable cause to arrest a person | Argues Minnick (odor => car search) does not automatically permit arrest/search of person | Government relied on Minnick-like reasoning to justify person-search | Court explained Minnick supports vehicle searches but arrest requires particularized link to person; here linkage satisfied by sole occupancy and fresh odor |
Key Cases Cited
- Minnick v. United States, 607 A.2d 519 (D.C. 1992) (odor of contraband from a car can give probable cause to search the vehicle)
- Wilson v. United States, 802 A.2d 367 (D.C. 2002) (officer smelled strong PCP and saw packaging, supporting search/arrest)
- Millet v. United States, 977 A.2d 932 (D.C. 2009) (search preceding formal arrest can be lawful if probable cause to arrest existed and arrest follows quickly)
- Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search-incident-to-arrest doctrine: search justified by officer safety and preservation of evidence)
- Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (authority to search stems from the fact of custodial arrest)
- Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) (search-incident-to-arrest exception requires an actual custodial arrest; issuing a citation does not authorize a full search)