Thomas Hilliard v. Andrew Saul, 964 F.3d 759

In 2015 Thomas Hilliard applied for disability insurance benefits and SSI; an ALJ found him not disabled, assigning an RFC for light, unskilled work.
ALJ relied on three consultative examiners, Hilliard’s daily activities (including walking at a mall), clinician statements, and his past fast-food work.
The ALJ gave partial weight to one-time examiner Dr. Majed Barazanji and little weight to treating physician assistant David Yurdin (a checklist opinion).
Hilliard submitted a test showing second-grade reading comprehension; the ALJ’s VE hypothetical used only “unskilled work” and “short and simple” instructions, not the specific reading-score.
The district court affirmed; Hilliard appealed, arguing (1) improper weighing of medical opinions, (2) inadequate VE hypothetical for cognitive limitation, and (3) an Appointments Clause challenge. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Weight given to Dr. Barazanji (consultative examiner)	ALJ should have given greater weight to Barazanji’s limits (stand ≤30 min; walk ≤2 blocks).	Other consultative exams contradict Barazanji; he examined Hilliard once and his own observations were inconsistent with extreme limits.	Affirmed: partial weight proper—one-time consult, inconsistent with other exams/observations.
Weight given to PA Yurdin (treating source)	ALJ erred by discounting Yurdin’s opinion as a treating source.	PA is not an acceptable medical source for claims before Mar 27, 2017; Yurdin’s checklist form was conclusory and of little evidentiary value.	Affirmed: ALJ permissibly afforded little weight to the checklist PA opinion.
Adequacy of VE hypothetical re: cognitive/reading limitation	Hypothetical failed to account for second-grade reading level; VE answer not supported.	Hypothetical captured concrete consequences via “short and simple” instructions and Hilliard’s prior fast-food work; no evidence reading level changed.	Affirmed: hypothetical adequately captured cognitive limits; supports ALJ’s step-4 conclusion.
Appointments Clause challenge	ALJ’s appointment violated the Appointments Clause.	Challenge not raised before ALJ.	Not considered on appeal (issue not raised administratively).

Tang v. Apfel, 205 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2000) (substantial-evidence standard of review for ALJ decisions)
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148 (2019) (defining substantial evidence as such relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept)
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (classic formulation of substantial-evidence standard)
Brown v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2004) (court may not reverse simply because record could support a different outcome)
Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 1998) (one-time consultative examiner’s opinion generally not substantial evidence)
Sloan v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2007) (physician assistant not an acceptable medical source for claims before March 27, 2017)
Thomas v. Berryhill, 881 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 2018) (checked-box forms and conclusory statements have little evidentiary value)
Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186 (8th Cir. 1994) (ALJ may decide without obtaining more medical evidence if record otherwise sufficient)
Newton v. Chater, 92 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 1996) (hypothetical to VE must precisely describe claimant’s impairments)
Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2006) (hypothetical must capture concrete consequences of impairments)
Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577 (8th Cir. 2001) (description of capability for "simple" work can suffice where claimant has low reading/ability level)