Thomas Hill v. Cindi Curtin
792 F.3d 670
| 6th Cir. | 2015Background
- Thomas Hill informed the trial court he wished to represent himself on the first day of trial, just before jurors entered; the judge denied the request as untimely and disruptive.
- Hill was later convicted of armed robbery and carjacking and sentenced to concurrent 20–40 year terms as a third-felony habitual offender.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals found the trial court failed to follow state Faretta/Anderson procedures but concluded the record did not show Hill’s request was knowingly and intelligently made; the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, holding Hill’s request was untimely and would have disrupted proceedings.
- Hill sought federal habeas relief; the district court denied the petition under AEDPA; an initial panel granted a writ but the en banc Sixth Circuit vacated that order and the en banc court affirmed denial of habeas relief.
- Majority: applied AEDPA deference and held (1) Supreme Court precedent does not require a Faretta-style inquiry before denying an untimely request and (2) Michigan’s timeliness determination was not an unreasonable application of clearly established law nor an unreasonable factual finding.
- Dissent (Judge Donald): argued Faretta’s core rule requires inquiry into whether a defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary regardless of timing absent an adequate and independent state procedural bar; Michigan had no such settled bar and the trial court’s failure to inquire violated the Sixth Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hill) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court violated Sixth Amendment by denying self-representation without Faretta inquiry | Hill: denial without inquiry violated Faretta because request was unequivocal and arose from breakdown with counsel | State: request was untimely and denial as disruptive was permissible; no Faretta inquiry required before denying an untimely request | Court: denied habeas — AEDPA deference; Supreme Court has not clearly required a Faretta inquiry before denying untimely requests; state-court ruling not objectively unreasonable |
| Whether Faretta establishes a bright-line timeliness rule | Hill: timing alone cannot excuse failure to inquire; Faretta’s protections apply when request is asserted | State: timing is relevant; Faretta involved a request made weeks before trial and courts may deem late requests forfeited | Court: Faretta contains a loose timing element but no Supreme Court bright-line rule; state courts have leeway to treat late requests as forfeited |
| Whether Michigan’s factual finding (disruption/inconvenience) was unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2) | Hill: trial judge made no detailed record showing how self-representation would disrupt trial — factual finding unreasonable | State: judge reasonably inferred last‑minute self-representation would cause delay; Michigan Supreme Court’s reading of record debatable but not unreasonable | Court: factual determination debatable and therefore not unreasonable; no relief under AEDPA |
| Whether Michigan invoked an independent adequate state procedural bar (timeliness) preventing federal review | Hill: Michigan had not adopted a per se day-of-trial bar; timeliness was not an adequate independent state ground | State: relied on untimeliness and disruption to affirm denial | Court (majority): this argument was forfeited and Michigan did not apply a categorical rule; AEDPA deference applies. Dissent disagreed and would treat timing as procedural bar lacking adequate foundation |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (recognizes Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and requires inquiry to ensure waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary)
- Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152 (2000) (right to self-representation is not absolute; courts may require timely assertion)
- Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (trial courts must warn defendants of hazards of proceeding pro se; no specific script required)
- Moore v. Haviland, 531 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2008) (trial court’s failure to rule or conduct Faretta-compliant inquiry on unequivocal pro se requests violated clearly established law)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference: state-court decisions must be upheld unless no fairminded jurist could agree they were correct)
- Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (defines § 2254(d)(1) “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” standards)