984 F.3d 347
4th Cir.2021Background
- Plaintiff Thomas Heyer is Deaf, uses American Sign Language (ASL) as his primary language, and is civilly detained under the Adam Walsh Act at FCI Butner’s Maryland Unit.
- Expert testimony (Dr. Thomas Cokely) established that ASL is a distinct visual language, many native Deaf persons have very limited written-English proficiency, and isolation from ASL communication risks social and linguistic harms.
- BOP provided SecureVRS (video relay) service and in-person ASL interpreters but disabled point-to-point videophone calls (direct ASL-to-ASL video) for security reasons; available alternatives included TTY, written mail, TRULINCS e-mail, and in-person visits.
- BOP justified the ban citing risks of coded/as-yet-unmonitored ASL communications, potential exploitation, child-exploitation risks given Heyer’s history, and costs/IT security procedures.
- The district court after a two-day bench trial found for BOP; the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding the district court clearly erred on Turner Factors Two through Four and remanded for entry of judgment for Heyer.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether BOP’s total ban on point-to-point videophone calls violates the First Amendment under Turner | Heyer: the ban unreasonably restricts his right to communicate with the Deaf community because he cannot effectively use written-English alternatives | BOP: the ban is reasonably related to legitimate nonpunitive interests (safety, public protection, rehabilitation, IT security, costs) | Court: Factor One satisfied for BOP (rational connection), but overall Turner analysis favors Heyer because Factors Two–Four were improperly resolved for BOP |
| Turner Factor Two — Are adequate alternative means available? | Heyer: TTY, e-mail, mail, and VRS do not permit fluent ASL communication with the Deaf community due to his very limited written-English skills | BOP: existing alternatives (SecureVRS, TTY, mail, TRULINCS, visits) are available and sufficient | Held: District court clearly erred; alternatives do not adequately allow Heyer to communicate with the Deaf community (Factor Two favors Heyer) |
| Turner Factor Three — Will accommodation significantly impact prison staff/inmates or resources? | Heyer: SecureVRS hardware and existing safeguards (preapproved numbers, recording, staff supervision, ability to disconnect) mitigate risks and reduce staff burden relative to TTY | BOP: point-to-point calls create unique ripple effects (coded ASL, leverage by inmates, need for live translation, monitoring burdens) | Held: District court clearly erred; record shows safeguards and existing practices minimize ripple effects and costs (Factor Three favors Heyer) |
| Turner Factor Four — Are there ready alternatives at de minimis cost to BOP’s interests? | Heyer: point-to-point calls could be provided under SecureVRS protocols, recorded and post-hoc translated, with de minimis additional cost and limited safety risk | BOP: live monitoring/translation and heightened public-safety risks (given Heyer’s history and unit population) make accommodation unacceptable | Held: District court clearly erred; adequate, low-cost safeguards exist and a total ban is an exaggerated response (Factor Four favors Heyer) |
Key Cases Cited
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (prison regulations valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological or nonpunitive interests)
- Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (prison restrictions assessed under Turner factors; alternatives need not be ideal)
- Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. 2017) (prior appeal reversing summary judgment on videophone claim)
- Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 1995) (standards for reversing factual findings as clearly erroneous)
- Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2015) (application of Turner factor analysis)
- Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2017) (legitimate nonpunitive interests for Adam Walsh detainees)
- Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 2014) (defining scope of religious/prisoner rights under Turner)
- Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2002) (Turner is fact-specific; alternatives and costs evaluated in context)
- Kikumura v. Turner, 28 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 1994) (prison must consider possible accommodations and estimate expenses)
- Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (inmates retain First Amendment rights consistent with incarceration)
- O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (prison regulation analysis under Turner framework)
- Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (rights in prison must be construed sensibly and expansively)