416 S.W.3d 845
Tenn. Ct. App.2013Background
- Thomas Rutherford (Father) and Melodey Lawson (Mother) divorced in 2007; they share one child and had a parenting plan under an Agreed Order.
- In January 2012 Mother notified via certified mail of her plan to relocate to Omaha, Nebraska; Father acknowledged receipt.
- Father verbally opposed the relocation at a January 25, 2012 meeting, but did not file a written opposition within 30 days of the notice.
- Mother filed a Petition to Relocate; Father filed a Petition in Opposition 83 days after notice; TRO temporarily prevented relocation.
- Trial court initially allowed consideration beyond the 30-day window, then ruled the 30-day period could be excused; later, after a merits trial, favored Father.
- Appellate court held the 30-day opposition deadline under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(g) is mandatory; since Father filed his petition after 30 days, relocation must be permitted, reversing the trial court and allowing Mother to relocate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the 30-day petition in opposition mandatory or permissive? | Mother argues the 30-day period is mandatory, requiring timely written opposition. | Father argues the period is permissive when read with other subsections and excusable neglect may apply. | Mandatory; untimely petition bars further opposition analysis. |
| If no timely petition is filed, may relocation proceed without considering best interests? | Mother contends no further analysis is needed once the 30-day period expires without opposition. | Father contends the court should still consider relevant factors and best interests. | Relocation permitted; no further analysis required if no timely opposition. |
| Does Rule 6.02 excusable neglect apply to enlarge the 30-day deadline in this statutory relocation context? | N/A (not favorable to delay in relocation under the statute). | Father invokes excusable neglect to enlarge time to file. | Rule 6.02 enlargement does not govern this mandatory 30-day deadline; the statute is controlling. |
Key Cases Cited
- U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 277 S.W.3d 381 (Tenn. 2009) (statutory interpretation and presumption principles guiding plain-language meaning)
- Kawatra v. Kawatra, 182 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2005) (relocation statute framework and preservation of consistency in proceedings)
- In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. 2012) (statutory interpretation and de novo review standard)