Thomas Dewey Pope v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 9044

Pope was convicted in Broward County, Florida, in 1982 of three murders, with Walters killed in 1981, Doranz and Di Russo killed in 1981; the bodies were found as described in the record.
During sentencing, Pope personally preferred death over life imprisonment, and trial counsel did not present extensive mitigation; prosecutor emphasized there was no hope for the victims, and Pope’s counsel did not object to the closing argument.
The jury recommended life for Doranz/Di Russo and death for Walters; the trial court imposed death with four aggravating factors and one mitigating factor (Vietnam service).
Pope pursued post-conviction relief in Florida and then federal habeas corpus, with initial district court relief reversed on appeal; proceedings culminated in a four-day evidentiary hearing on remand, and the district court again found merit to some claims.
Under AEDPA, the Florida Supreme Court’s merits ruling is reviewed to determine whether it was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, limited to the state-court record by Cullen v. Pinholster.
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately held that Pope failed to show Strickland prejudice based on the state record and that the Florida Supreme Court’s denial was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law; the district court’s grant of habeas relief was reversed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Florida Supreme Court's denial of penalty-phase ineffectiveness claims was reasonable under §2254(d).	Pope contends the state court unreasonably applied Strickland to the penal phase.	Florida Supreme Court reasonably applied Strickland given the thin record and lack of prejudice.	No—denial was reasonable under §2254(d)(1).
Whether failure to investigate/present mitigation evidence prejudiced Pope at sentencing.	Lack of mitigation evidence deprived Pope of meaningful penalty-phase presentation.	Record shows no reasonable probability that additional mitigation would have changed the outcome.	No—no reasonable probability of different outcome; no prejudice.
Whether failure to object to prosecutorial comment about Pope's death-preference was prejudicial.	Defense counsel's failure prejudiced Pope by allowing improper evidence of preference for death.	Jury heard multiple references to death preference; comment was not outcome-determinative given strong aggravation.	No—prejudice not shown; not unreasonable to deny relief on this claim.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes deficient-performance and prejudice prongs)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (clearly established federal law; standard for 'unreasonable application')
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (U.S. 2011) (unreasonable-application standard for §2254(d)(1))
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (U.S. 2011) (limits §2254(d) review to state-court record)
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (U.S. 2010) (reweighing totality of mitigating and aggravating evidence)
Sochor v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 685 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2012) (evaluates prejudice and mitigation in context of extensive evidence)
Gilreath v. Head, 234 F.3d 547 (11th Cir. 2000) (burden on petitioner to show likelihood of allowing mitigation)
Glock v. Moore, 195 F.3d 625 (11th Cir. 1999) (new mitigation evidence must be non-cumulative and persuasive)
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (U.S. 2014) (limits federal-review standard under §2254(d))