Thomas Dewalt v. Davidson Surface Air and Donald Davidson, 449 S.W.3d 401

DeWalt, a truck driver, sued his employer (Davidson Surface Air and owner Donald Davidson) under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) for constructive discharge based on disability; jury found Davidson individually liable but not the company and awarded $7,500.
DeWalt sought $133,198.50 in trial attorneys’ fees under § 213.111.2 MHRA; trial court awarded $75,000 initially without explanation; this court previously reversed and remanded for findings.
On remand the trial court made findings, excluded certain fee entries (including all time preparing the fee application), reduced some client-communication time, and applied a 30% reduction to discourage settlements after a small verdict, awarding $87,200.75 for trial fees and $15,000 for appellate fees.
This appeal challenges (1) the trial court’s 30% reduction (argued to be improperly tied to the small verdict and settlement policy) and (2) exclusion of fees for preparing the fee petition and reduction of appellate fees.
The appellate court affirms most fee findings but reverses the 30% reduction and the total exclusion of fee-application time, and remands both trial and appellate fee awards for additional findings and recalculation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court abused discretion by reducing fees 30% to encourage settlement	30% cut improperly bases award on small verdict and ignored MHRA public-purpose factor	Reductions tied to proportionality to damages and settlement policy to avoid fee windfalls	Reversed as abuse: court relied on settlement policy without factual findings and failed to consider nature/importance of MHRA claim
Whether fees for preparing fee application are compensable	Time preparing fee petition is reasonable and should be compensated	Time preparing fee petition may be excluded or reduced	Reversed exclusion: reasonable time for fee petitions is compensable; total exclusion was improper
Whether reductions for client/co-counsel communications were improper	Communication time is ethically required and compensable	Some communication time was excessive and reducible	Affirmed in part: modest reduction ($1,800) within court’s discretion
Whether appellate fee award improperly reduced	Appellate work took substantial time; court should consider full success on appeal and vigor of opposition	Appeal was not complex; over 100 hours was excessive	Reversed and remanded: trial court failed to make findings on complete success on appeal and importance of MHRA claim; must reconsider and explain adjustments

DeWalt v. Davison Service/Air, Inc., 398 S.W.3d 491 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (prior appeal setting out MHRA fee factors and remanding for findings)
Gilliland v. Missouri Athletic Club, 273 S.W.3d 516 (Mo. banc 2009) (courts must consider public-purpose/nature of MHRA claims when awarding fees)
Coyle v. City of St. Louis, 408 S.W.3d 281 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (enumerating factors for MHRA fee awards; degree of success key)
El-Tabech v. Clarke, 616 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2010) (reasonable time spent preparing fee petitions is compensable in civil-rights cases)
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (settlement encouragement and fee objectives are not inherently incompatible)
Williams v. Trans States Airlines, 281 S.W.3d 854 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (trial court discretion in fee awards but must explain reductions)
Pollock v. Wetterau Food Distribution Group, 11 S.W.3d 754 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999) (appellate hours are part of compensable MHRA fee award)
Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1988) (settlement-policy considerations apply only when settlement conduct is at issue)