Thomas Boaz v. United States
884 F.3d 808
8th Cir.2018Background
- Thomas Boaz was sentenced in 2009 to 190 months’ imprisonment after the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement.
- In 2016 Boaz filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition arguing Johnson v. United States invalidated the ACCA residual clause, so he no longer qualified as an armed career criminal and sought resentencing.
- The Government argued (1) Boaz’s 1974 Arizona conviction for exhibiting a deadly weapon qualifies under the ACCA force clause, so ACCA still applies; and (2) even without ACCA, the district court could lawfully impose 190 months because each count’s statutory maximum (without ACCA) would still permit the sentence.
- The Arizona statute (repealed) criminalized drawing or exhibiting a deadly weapon in a threatening manner or unlawfully using it in a fight or quarrel, and the conviction is punishable by >1 year imprisonment.
- The Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the Arizona conviction categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA’s force clause and compared the Arizona statute to a materially similar Missouri statute previously held to satisfy the force clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Boaz’s 1974 Arizona conviction satisfies the ACCA force clause (i.e., necessarily involves use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force) | Boaz: Arizona statute can reach non-threatening conduct "likely to endanger" others; thus it does not necessarily require threatened use of physical force and fails the categorical test | Govt: The statute requires exhibiting a "deadly" weapon in a threatening manner or unlawful use in a fight; materially indistinguishable from Missouri statute held to be a threatened use of force, so it qualifies | Held: The Arizona conviction qualifies under the ACCA force clause; Boaz remains an armed career criminal without relying on the residual clause |
| Whether Boaz’s sentence would remain lawful even if ACCA did not apply because the sentence did not exceed statutory maxima for his counts | Boaz: Sentence rests on ACCA enhancement and should be vacated if ACCA no longer applies | Govt: Even without ACCA, district court had authority to impose 190 months because statutory maximums for the counts permit it; § 2255 claim fails if sentence within statutory limits | Held: Court affirmed on predicate issue and did not need to resolve alternative statutory-maximum argument (but noted precedent supports the Government’s position) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jordan, 812 F.3d 1183 (8th Cir.) (defines "physical force" as violent force for ACCA force-clause analysis)
- Jones v. United States, 870 F.3d 750 (8th Cir.) (explains categorical approach and ACCA force-clause elements)
- United States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d 784 (8th Cir.) (holding that displaying a weapon in an angry or threatening manner qualifies as threatened use of physical force)
- United States v. Hudson, 851 F.3d 807 (8th Cir.) (reaffirming Pulliam on weapon-display offenses in force-clause context)
- United States v. Boaz, 558 F.3d 800 (8th Cir.) (Boaz’s direct appeal where the Arizona offense was compared to the Missouri offense)
- Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. en banc) (holding that a sentence within statutory maximum does not present a cognizable § 2255 claim)
